34 resultados para arts, arts policy, creative economy, economic development, industry cluster
Resumo:
This article is the introduction to a special issue of The Developing Economies which presented the results of a research project by the Institute of Developing Economies that examined the development mechanisms in Korea and Taiwan. Our conclusion in this article is that their development mechanisms, despite their similar development patterns of export-led industrialization, have been essentially different: a government-led mechanism in Korea as opposed to a market-led mechanism in Taiwan. We verified this difference through comparative studies of the two economies covering trade balances, the growth of total factor productivity, the scale of enterprises and business groups, and the development processes of individual manufacturing sectors. In our explanatory discussion we propose that the difference in the mechanisms is based on: 1) the amount of accumulation in the economy at the time postwar industrialization started, 2) the relationship between government and society, and 3) the mechanism of social network formation.
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A flowchart approach to industrial cluster policy emphasizes the importance ofthe ordering of policy measures. The flow of policy implementation is to establish an industrial zone, to invite an anchor company, and to promote its related companies to invest in the industrial zone. This article delineated "a flowchart approach to industrial cluster policy" by proposing sufficient conditions for forming industrial clusters typical in the manufacturing industry in Asia to enhance regional economic growth. The typical industrial cluster policy was theorized by defining an industrial zone as "quasi-public goods", and it was shown that the policy enhances economic growth under a production function of "increasing returns to scale" of an anchor company. Critical amounts of the production of "scale economies" that are used by the related companies to decide whether or not to invest in clusters were also shown.
Resumo:
This article examined the issue of whether or not the currency exchange rate, country risk, and cooperate tax rate affect decisions of multinational firms to invest in industrial clusters. First, if the exchange rate between a multinational company in an industry of diminishing returns to scale and a developing country is appreciated, then production in the developing country should increase. Second, if the investment period becomes longer, the currency exchange rate of a multinational company's country should be revalued more in order for it to further invest in the developing country. Third, if the investment period becomes longer, the developing country's risk should become less. Fourth, compensation for the developing country's high risk can be made by lowering its corporate tax rate.
Resumo:
China’s huge domestic market is constantly expanding, and is low-end demand oriented and highly dispersed. The domestic market-based development of China’s industrial cluster, however, is not only a quantitative expansion, but has also been accompanied with remarkable qualitative upgrading. Specialized markets are a microcosm that clearly indicate this paradoxical phenomenon. By analyzing three typical cases of industrial clusters that have specialized markets, this paper will make the case that under modern China’s market conditions, the local public sector is the crucial driving force for upgrading industrial clusters, which organize complicated transactions, promote quality control, and stimulate the division of labor.
Resumo:
Starting from almost null in the late 1990s, China's mobile phone handset industry has grown to account for more than 40 percent of the current world production. While export growth has been overwhelmingly led by multi-national corporations (MNCs), increasingly fierce competition in the domestic market ignited by the advent of local handset makers has induced unique industrial evolution: (1) outgrowth of independent design houses specialized in handset development and (2) emergence of IC fabless ventures that design core ICs for handsets. In the background of this evolutionary industrial growth there are factors such as, the scale and increasing diversity of China's domestic market that advantages local firms vis-a-vis MNCs; modularization of handset and semiconductor technologies; policy interventions that supports local startups. The emergence and evolution of China's handset industry is likely to have international implications as the growth of the global demand for low-cost and multi-function mobile phone handsets is expected to accelerate. Thus, our case suggests that the conventional view of latecomer industrialization and upgrading that emphasizes the key role of international production networks organized by MNCs needs to be modified in order to accommodate China's rise into perspective.
Resumo:
Economic backwardness often influences the growth of firms in developing countries. In this paper, we investigate the growth conditions and paths available for latecomers competing with first movers. Employing the concepts of boundaries of the firm and the disadvantage of backwardness, we present a case study of China's mobile handset industry and proceed to develop a simple model. We find that although significant disadvantage does not allow latecomers to grow, there are possibilities for changing the conditions of growth if latecomers can utilize outside resources and/or indigenous advantages.
Resumo:
Using a Dynamic General Equilibrium (DGE) model, this study examines the effects of monetary policy in economies where minimum wages are bound. The findings show that the monetary-policy effect on a binding-minimum-wage economy is relatively small and quite persistent. This result suggests that these two characteristics of monetary policy in the minimum-wage model are rather different from those in the union-negotiation model which is often assumed to account for industrial economies.
Resumo:
Introduction : Economic reform in Indonesia after the Asian currency crisis is often discussed in parallel with Thailand and South Korea, which were alike hit by the crisis. It should however be noted that what happened in Indonesia was a change of political regime from authoritarianism to democracy, not just a change of government as seen in Thailand and South Korea. Indonesia’s post-crisis reform should be understood in the context of dismantling of the Soeharto regime to seek a new democratic state system. In the political sphere, dramatic institutional changes have occurred since the downfall of the Soeharto government in May 1998. In comparison, changes in the economic sphere are more complex than the political changes, as the former involve at least three aspects. The first is the continuity in the basic framework of capitalist system with policy orientation toward economic liberalization. In this framework, the policies to overcome the crisis are continued from the last period of the Soeharto rule, under the support system of IMF and CGI (Consultative Group on Indonesia). The second aspect is the impact of the political regime change on the economic structure. It is considered that the structure of economic vested interests of the Soeharto regime is being disintegrated as the regime breaks down. The third aspect is the impact of the political regime change on economic policy-making process. The process of formulating and implementing policies has changed drastically from the Soeharto time. With these three aspects simultaneously at work, it is not so easy to identify which of them is the main cause for a given specific economic phenomenon emerging in Indonesia today. Keeping this difficulty in mind, this paper attempts to situate the post-crisis economic reform in the broader context of the historical development of Indonesian economic policies and their achievements. We focus in particular on the reform policies for banking and corporate sectors and resulting structural changes in these sectors. This paper aims at understanding the significance of the changes in the economic ownership structure that are occurring in the post-Soeharto Indonesia. Economic policies here do not mean macro economic policies, such as fiscal, financial and trade policies, but refer to micro economic policies whereby the government intervenes in the economic ownership structure. In Section 1, we clarify why economic policies for intervening in the ownership structure are important in understanding Indonesia. Section 2 follows the historical development of Indonesia’s economic policies as specified above, throughout the four successive periods since Indonesia’s independence, namely, the parliamentary democracy period, the Guided Democracy period under Soekarno, the Soeharto-regime consolidation period, and the Soeharto-regime transfiguration period2. Then we observe what economic ownership structure was at work in the pre-crisis last days of the Soeharto rule as an outcome of the economic policies. In Section 3, we examine what structural changes have taken place in the banking and corporate sectors due to the reform policies in the post-crisis and post-Soeharto Indonesia. Lastly in Section 4, we interpret the current reorganization of the economic ownership in the context of the historical transition of the ownership structure, taking account of the changes in the policy-making processes under democratization.
Resumo:
Introduction: During the period from the latter half of the 1980s until just before the Asian currency crisis in 1997, Indonesia’s economic development had drawn expectations and attention from various quarters, along with Malaysia and Thailand within the same Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). In fact, the 1993 report by the World Bank, entitled “East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy,” recognized Indonesia as one of the East Asian economies with the strong economic performance, i.e. sustained economic growth (World Bank [1993]). And it was the manufacturing industry that had been the driving force behind Indonesia’s economic growth during that period. Since the 1997 outbreak of the Asian currency crisis, however, the manufacturing sector in Indonesia has been mired in a situation that rules out the kind of bright prospects it had emanated previously. The Indonesian economy is still in the developing stage, and in accordance with the history of industrial structural changes in other countries, Indonesia’s manufacturing industry can still be expected to serve as the engine of the country’s economic development. But is it really possible in an environment where economic liberalization and globalization are forging ahead? And, what sort of problems have to be dealt with to make it possible? To answer these questions, it is necessary to know the current conditions of Indonesia’s manufacturing sector, and to do that, it becomes important to think back on the history of the country’s industrialization. Thus, this paper is intended to retrace and unlock the track of Indonesia’s industrialization up until the establishment of the manufacturing sector in its present form, with the ultimate goal being to give answers to the above-mentioned questions. Subject to an analysis in this paper is the period from the installment of President Soeharto’s administration onward when industrialization of the modern industrial sector2 moved into high gear. The composition of this paper is outlined below. Section 1 first shows why it is important to examine import substitution and export orientation, both of which are used as the measures of the analysis in this paper, in tracking the history of the industrialization, and then discuss indicators of import substitution and export orientation as well as statistical data and resources needed to develop those indicators. Section 2 clarifies the status of the manufacturing industry among all industries by looking at the composition ratio of the manufacturing industry in terms of value added, imports and exports. Section 3 to 5 cover three periods between 1971 and 1995 and make an analysis of import substitution, export orientation and changes in the industrial structure for each period. Section 3 analyzes the period from 1971 through 1985, when Indonesia pursued the import substitution policy amid the oil boom. Section 4 covers the period from 1985 through 1990, when the packages of deregulatory measures were announced successively under structural adjustment policies made necessary by the fall in oil prices. Section 5 examines the period from 1990 through 1995, which saw the alternate shifts between the overheating of the economy by sharply rising investment by both domestic and foreign investors in the wake of the liberalization of investment, trade and financial services, and polices to cool down the economy. Section 6, which covers the 1995-1999 period straddling the economic crisis, is designed for an analysis of the changes in production trends before and after the economic crisis as well as the changes in the industrial structure. Section 7, after summing up the history of Indonesia’s industrialization examined in the previous sections, discusses problems found in respective sectors and attempts to present future prospects for the country’s manufacturing industry.
Resumo:
In spite of the difficulties incurred by its people, Cuba has maintained a centrally planned economy with single party system. On the contrary, Vietnam has introduced a market economy under communist rule, and succeeded in generally improving living standards. The factors that contributed to the introduction of Vietnamese-style reforms are (1) severe economic crisis, (2) demonstration effects from neighboring countries, (3) poor social policy, (4) initiatives by ex-conservative leader/s, and (5) weak state capacity. The conditions to sustain high economic growth are (1) social sectors familiar with capitalist economics, (2) abundant labor forces with relatively low labor cost, and (3) investment by exiles. This paper analyzes to what extent Cuba meets these conditions.
Resumo:
Cambodia has experienced high economic growth in the last decade. Because most of its industries were destroyed during the Pol Pot regime and civil war, in the last 20 years the country has been working hard to liberalize its economy to attract foreign investors With its efforts to join the regional and international community and with changes in the international trade environment, Cambodia started to grow its economy in the late 1990s. Now, in the early 21st century, the Cambodian economy seems to be prepared to take off. We can observe a kind of industrial agglomeration occurring, even though still at a small scale. In this paper, first, I will review the history of Cambodia’s economic development since the late 1980s. Second, I will examine the economic policies, laws, rules, and other environmental factors which have influenced industrial development and industrial location in Cambodia. Third, I will introduce industrial location in the late 2000s. Lastly, I will introduce some statistical data for the future analysis of industrial location in Cambodia.
Resumo:
Green innovation, which enables us to extract energy from food crops, caused a food shortage in 2008. Countries suffering severe damage started to reconsider their agricultural policy with the aim of becoming more autonomous. The food price hike of the time looks like a reversal of the celebrated Singer-Prebisch thesis proposed in the 1950s. This paper examines the consequences of this trend on the comparative advantages and development strategies of developing countries. For that purpose, first, trends and short-run fluctuations in the prices of fuel and bio-energy crops are investigated. It is shown that the price series of fuels and the crops are synchronized only after the fuel extracting technology came into effect. Second, the reversal of the Singer-Prebisch thesis is underpinned by the generic form of an endogenous growth model developed by Rebelo (1991). It is shown that as an economy grows, appreciation of the non-reproducible, such as mineral resources and raw labor, over the reproducible, such as capital goods, is the norm rather than an anomaly. Third, the consequences of the food price hike and underlying capital accumulation on the development strategies of labor-abundant and low-income countries are explored. It is concluded that the impact of the food price hikes on the alteration of a development strategy is only incremental, without reinforcement from raw-labor-saving innovation. A case study of inventions by JUKI Corporation, a world-leader in the sewing machine market exemplifies the fact that, of all the major inventions the company have made, raw-labor-saving inventions have not dominated, although JUKI's machines are sold to one of the most raw-labor-intensive industries.
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Based mainly on secondary data and partly on primary information obtained through field surveys in selected rural areas in Bihar in 2011, this paper firstly argues the critical importance of agricultural growth for overall economic development, and then reviews the sluggish growth of agriculture in Bihar in the past and examines the major reasons for this. The long-term negligence of agricultural research (especially development and diffusion endeavors for improved rice varieties suitable to the local conditions of Bihar) by the state government and some sort of ‘backwardness’ in tube-well irrigation technology can be pointed out as important constraints. There is, in particular, the ‘paradox’ in Bihar agriculture of why rice and wheat yields have remained so low in spite of the relatively well-developed irrigation by tube-wells. Finally, by showing the process of a rapid increase in autumn and winter rice yields during the 1990s in West Bengal, it is suggested that Bihar farmers and policy-makers should learn from the experience of West Bengal in order to get some hints for the development of the rice sector in Bihar.
Resumo:
Despite more than two decades of transition from a centrally planned to a market-oriented economy, Myanmar’s economic transition is still only partly complete. The government’s initial strategy for dealing with the swelling deficits of the state economic enterprises (SEEs) was to put them under direct control in order to scrutinize their expenditures. This policy change postponed restructuring and exacerbated the soft budget constraint problem of the SEEs. While the installation of a new government in March 2011 has increased prospects for economic development, sustainable growth still requires full-scale structural reform of the SEEs and institutional infrastructure building. Myanmar can learn from the gradual approaches to economic transition in China and Vietnam, where partial reforms weakened further impetus for reforms.