29 resultados para Amelogénesis imperfect
Resumo:
This paper explores the interaction between upstream firms and downstream firms in a two-region general equilibrium model. In many countries, lower tariff rates are set for intermediate manufactured goods and higher tariff rates are set for final manufactured goods. The derived results imply that such settings of tariff rates tend to preserve a symmetric spread of upstream and downstream firms, and continuing tariff reduction may cause core-periphery structures. In the case in which the circular causality between upstream and downstream firms is focused as agglomeration forces, the present model is fully solved. Thus, we find that (1) the present model displays, at most, three interior steady states, (2) when the asymmetric steady-states exist, they are unstable and (3) location displays hysteresis when the transport costs of intermediate manufactured goods are sufficiently high.
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This chapter attempts to identify whether product differentiation or geographical differentiation is the main source of profit for firms in developing economies by employing a simple idea from the recently developed method of empirical industrial organization. Theoretically, location choice and product choice have been considered as analogues in differentiation, but in the real world, which of these strategies is chosen will result in an immense difference in firm behavior and in the development process of the industry. Development of the technique of empirical industrial organization enabled us to identify market outcomes with endogeneity. A typical case is the market outcome with differentiation, where price or product choice is endogenously determined. Our original survey contains data on market location, differences in product types, and price. The results show that product differentiation rather than geographical differentiation mitigates pressure on price competition, but 70 per cent secures geographical monopoly.
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In a strategic trade policy, it is assumed, in this paper, that a government changes disbursement or levy method so that the reaction function of home firm approaches infinitely close to that of foreign firm. In the framework of Bertrand-Nash equilibrium, Eaton and Grossman[1986] showed that export tax is preferable to export subsidy. In this paper, it is shown that export subsidy is preferable to export tax in some cases in the framework of Bertrand-Nash equilibrium, considering the uncertainty in demand. Historically, many economists mentioned non-linear subsidy or tax. However, optimum solution of it has not yet been shown. The optimum solution is shown in this paper.
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A typical implicit assumption on monopolistic competition models for trade and economic geography is that firms can produce and sell only at one place. This paper fallows endogenous determination of the number of plants in a new economic geography model and examine the stable outcomes of organization choice between single-plant and multi-plant in two regions. We explicitly consider the firms' trade-off between larger economies of scale under single plant configuration and the saving in interregional transport costs under multi-plant configuration. We show that organization change arises under decreasing transportation costs and observe several organization configurations under a generalized cost function.
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This paper proposes a model that accounts for “export platform” FDI – a form of FDI that is common in the data but rarely discussed in the theoretical literature. Unlike the previous literature, this paper’s theory nests all the typical modes of supply, including exports, horizontal and vertical FDI, horizontal and vertical export platform FDI. The theory yields the testable hypothesis that a decrease in either inter-regional or intra-regional trade costs induces firms to choose export platform FDI. The empirical analysis provides descriptive statistics which point to large proportions of third country exports of US FDI, and an econometric analysis, whose results are in line with the model’s predictions. The last section suggests policy implications for nations seeking to attract FDI.
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This paper explains how the Armington-Krugman-Melitz supermodel developed by Dixon and Rimmer can be parameterized, and demonstrates that only two kinds of additional information are required in order to extend a standard trade model to include Melitz-type monopolistic competition and heterogeneous firms. Further, it is shown how specifying too much additional information leads to violations of the model constraints, necessitating adjustment and reconciliation of the data. Once a Melitz-type model is parameterized, a Krugman-type model can also be parameterized using the calibrated values in the Melitz-type model without any additional data. Sample code for the General Algebraic Modeling System (GAMS) has also been prepared to promote the innovative supermodel in the AGE community.
Resumo:
Countries classified as least developed countries (LDCs) were granted duty-free quota-free (DFQF) access to the Japanese market. This study examines the impact of that access and finds that, in general, it did not benefit the LDCs. The construction of concordance tables for Japan's 9 digit tariff line codes enables analysis at the tariff line level, which overcomes a possible aggregation bias. The exogenous nature of DFQF access mitigates the endogeneity problem. Various estimation models, including the triple difference estimator, show that in general the LDCs did not benefit from DFQF access to the Japanese market. The total value of imports from LDCs has been increasing, but the imports granted both zero tariffs and substantial preference margins over non-LDC countries were not successful. These findings suggest that for LDCs the tariff barrier is a relatively small obstacle: Trade is affected more strongly by other factors, such as infrastructure, nontariff barriers, geographic distance, and cultural differences.
Resumo:
This paper shows how an Armington-Krugman-Melitz encompassing module based on Dixon and Rimmer (2012) can be calibrated, and clarifies the choice of initial levels for two kinds of number of firms, or parameter values for two kinds of fixed costs, that enter a Melitz-type specification can be set freely to any preferred value, just as the cases we derive quantities from given value data assuming some of the initial prices to be unity. In consequence, only one kind of additional information, which is on the shape parameter related to productivity, just is required in order to incorporate Melitz-type monopolistic competition and heterogeneous firms into a standard applied general equilibrium model. To be a Krugman-type, nothing is needed. This enables model builders in applied economics to fully enjoy the featured properties of the theoretical models invented by Krugman (1980) and Melitz (2003) in practical policy simulations at low cost.
Resumo:
To prepare an answer to the question of how a developing country can attract FDI, this paper explored the factors and policies that may help bring FDI into a developing country by utilizing an extended version of the knowledge-capital model. With a special focus on the effects of FTAs/EPAs between market countries and developing countries, simulations with the model revealed the following: (1) Although FTA/EPA generally ends to increase FDI to a developing country, the possibility of improving welfare through increased demand for skilled and unskilled labor becomes higher as the size of the country declines; (2) Because the additional implementation of cost-saving policies to reduce firm-type/trade-link specific fixed costs ends to depreciate the price of skilled labor by saving its input, a developing country, which is extremely scarce in skilled labor, is better off avoiding the additional option; (3) If a country hopes to enjoy larger welfare gains with EPA, efforts to increase skilled labor in the country, such as investing in education, may be beneficial.
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This paper explore how simulation results change with different choice of trade specification, and the strength of preference for traded variety by economic agent differs, utilizing two types of three-region, three-sector AGE model that includes the Armington-Krugman-Melitz Encompassing module based on Dixon and Rimmer (2012). Simulation experiments reveal that: (1) the Melitz-type specification does not always enhance effectiveness of a certain policy change more than the one obtained with the Krugman-type, especially when economic agents' preference for traded variety is not so strong; (2) there are likely to be points where the volumes of effects obtained with the Melitz-type exceed the ones with the Krugman-type; and (3) the preference of the producers, those who are in the sectors that exhibit increasing returns to scale, for traded variety might be the engine of explosive effects as suggested by Fujita, et al. (2000).
Resumo:
This paper proposes a general equilibrium model of a monocentric city based on Fujita and Krugman (1995). Two rates of transport costs per distance and for the same good are introduced. The model assumes that lower transport costs are available at a few points on a line. These lower costs represent new transport facilities, such as high-speed motorways and railways. Findings is that new transport facilities connecting the city and hinterlands strengthen the lock-in effects, which describes whether a city remains where it is forever after being created. Furthermore, the effect intensifies with better agricultural technologies and a larger population in the economy. The relationship between indirect utility and population size has an inverted U-shape, even if new transport facilities are used. However, the population size that maximizes indirect utility is smaller than that found in Fujita and Krugman (1995).
Resumo:
Crude oil and natural gas have been essential energy sources and play a crucial role in the world economy. Changes in energy prices significantly impact economic growth. This study builds an econometric model to illustrate the substitute relation between crude oil and natural gas markets. Additionally, the determination of the oil and natural gas prices are endogenized, assuming imperfect competition to reflect a real market strategy. Our empirical results show that the overall performance of this system is acceptable, and the model can be applied to policy analysis for determining monetary or energy policy by introducing this model to the more comprehensive system.
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This paper explores the potential usefulness of an AGE model with the Melitz-type trade specification to assess economic effects of technical regulations, taking the case of the EU ELV/RoHS directives as an example. Simulation experiments reveal that: (1) raising the fixed exporting cost to make sales in the EU market brings results that exports of the targeted commodities (motor vehicles and parts for ELV and electronic equipment for RoHS) to the EU from outside regions/countries expand while the domestic trade in the EU shrinks when the importer's preference for variety (PfV) is not strong; (2) if the PfV is not strong, policy changes that may bring reduction in the number of firms enable survived producers with high productivity to expand production to be large-scale mass producers fully enjoying the fruit of economies of scale; and (3) When the strength of the importer's PfV is changed from zero to unity, there is the value that totally changes simulation results and their interpretations.
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In a three-country oligopoly model, this paper analyzes a country's decisions concerning antidumping (AD) action against two foreign countries and the relationship between those decisions and regional trade agreements (RTAs). An RTA intensifies product-market competition in the markets of member countries and lowers product prices, while it raises export prices of goods subject to tariff reductions. This effect widens the dumping margin of the non-member firm and narrows the dumping margin of the member firm. If the government is more concerned with domestic firm profit in its AD decision, the RTA may invoke the member's AD action against the nonmember. If the governments attach a sufficiently high value on social welfare, however, the RTA may promote the AD action against the member. If the governments' weight on the domestic firm's profit is neither high nor low, an RTA may block the AD actions against both countries.