Théorie des jeux expérimentale & action motrice

How do sportspeople succeed in a non-collaborative game? An illustration of a perverse side effect of altruism Are team sports specialists predisposed to collaboration? The scientific literature on this topic is divided. The present article attempts to end this debate by applying experimental game theory. We constituted three groups of volunteers (all students aged around 20): 25 team sports specialists; 23 individual sports specialists (gymnasts, track & field athletes and swimmers) and a control group of 24 non-sportspeople. Each subgroup was divided into 3 teams that played against each other in turn (and not against teams from other subgroups). The teams played a game based on the well-known Prisoner's Dilemma (Tucker, 1950) - the paradoxical "Bluegill Sunbass Game" (Binmore, 1999) with three Nash equilibria (two suboptimal equilibria with a pure strategy and an optimal equilibrium with a mixed, egotistical strategy (p= 1/2)). This game also features a Harsanyi equilibrium (based on constant compliance with a moral code and altruism by empathy: "do not unto others that which you would not have them do unto you"). How, then, was the game played? Two teams of 8 competed on a handball court. Each team wore a distinctive jersey. The game lasted 15 minutes and the players were allowed to touch the handball ball with their feet or hands. After each goal, each team had to return to its own half of the court. Players were allowed to score in either goal and thus cooperate with their teammates or not, as they saw fit. A goal against the nominally opposing team (a "guardian" strategy, by analogy with the Bluegill Sunbass Game) earned a point for everyone in the team. For an own goal (a "sneaker" strategy), only the scorer earned a point - hence the paradox. If all the members of a team work together to score a goal, everyone is happy (the Harsanyi solution). However, the situation was not balanced in the Nashian sense: each player had a reason to be disloyal to his/her team at the merest opportunity. But if everyone adopts a "sneaker" strategy, the game becomes a free-for-all and the chances of scoring become much slimmer. In a context in which doubt reigns as to the honesty of team members and "legal betrayals", what type of sportsperson will score the most goals? By analogy with the Bluegill Sunbass Game, we recorded direct motor interactions (passes and shots) based on either a "guardian" tactic (i.e. collaboration within the team) or a "sneaker" tactic (shots and passes against the player's designated team). So, was the group of team sports specialist more collaborative than the other two groups? The answer was no. A statistical analysis (difference from chance in a logistic regression) enabled us to draw three conclusions: ?For the team sports specialists, the Nash equilibrium (1950) was stronger than the Harsanyi equilibrium (1977). ?The sporting principles of equilibrium and exclusivity are not appropriate in the Bluegill Sunbass Game and are quickly abandoned by the team sports specialists. The latter are opportunists who focus solely on winning and do well out of it. ?The most altruistic players are the main losers in the Bluegill Sunbass Game: they keep the game alive but contribute to their own defeat. In our experiment, the most altruistic players tended to be the females and the individual sports specialists

Théorie des jeux expérimentale & action motrice

How do sportspeople succeed in a non-collaborative game? An illustration of a perverse side effect of altruism Are team sports specialists predisposed to collaboration? The scientific literature on this topic is divided. The present article attempts to end this debate by applying experimental game theory. We constituted three groups of volunteers (all students aged around 20): 25 team sports specialists; 23 individual sports specialists (gymnasts, track & field athletes and swimmers) and a control group of 24 non-sportspeople. Each subgroup was divided into 3 teams that played against each other in turn (and not against teams from other subgroups). The teams played a game based on the well-known Prisoner's Dilemma (Tucker, 1950) - the paradoxical "Bluegill Sunbass Game" (Binmore, 1999) with three Nash equilibria (two suboptimal equilibria with a pure strategy and an optimal equilibrium with a mixed, egotistical strategy (p= 1/2)). This game also features a Harsanyi equilibrium (based on constant compliance with a moral code and altruism by empathy: "do not unto others that which you would not have them do unto you"). How, then, was the game played? Two teams of 8 competed on a handball court. Each team wore a distinctive jersey. The game lasted 15 minutes and the players were allowed to touch the handball ball with their feet or hands. After each goal, each team had to return to its own half of the court. Players were allowed to score in either goal and thus cooperate with their teammates or not, as they saw fit. A goal against the nominally opposing team (a "guardian" strategy, by analogy with the Bluegill Sunbass Game) earned a point for everyone in the team. For an own goal (a "sneaker" strategy), only the scorer earned a point - hence the paradox. If all the members of a team work together to score a goal, everyone is happy (the Harsanyi solution). However, the situation was not balanced in the Nashian sense: each player had a reason to be disloyal to his/her team at the merest opportunity. But if everyone adopts a "sneaker" strategy, the game becomes a free-for-all and the chances of scoring become much slimmer. In a context in which doubt reigns as to the honesty of team members and "legal betrayals", what type of sportsperson will score the most goals? By analogy with the Bluegill Sunbass Game, we recorded direct motor interactions (passes and shots) based on either a "guardian" tactic (i.e. collaboration within the team) or a "sneaker" tactic (shots and passes against the player's designated team). So, was the group of team sports specialist more collaborative than the other two groups? The answer was no. A statistical analysis (difference from chance in a logistic regression) enabled us to draw three conclusions: ?For the team sports specialists, the Nash equilibrium (1950) was stronger than the Harsanyi equilibrium (1977). ?The sporting principles of equilibrium and exclusivity are not appropriate in the Bluegill Sunbass Game and are quickly abandoned by the team sports specialists. The latter are opportunists who focus solely on winning and do well out of it. ?The most altruistic players are the main losers in the Bluegill Sunbass Game: they keep the game alive but contribute to their own defeat. In our experiment, the most altruistic players tended to be the females and the individual sports specialists

Théorie des jeux expérimentale & action motrice

How do sportspeople succeed in a non-collaborative game? An illustration of a perverse side effect of altruism Are team sports specialists predisposed to collaboration? The scientific literature on this topic is divided. The present article attempts to end this debate by applying experimental game theory. We constituted three groups of volunteers (all students aged around 20): 25 team sports specialists; 23 individual sports specialists (gymnasts, track & field athletes and swimmers) and a control group of 24 non-sportspeople. Each subgroup was divided into 3 teams that played against each other in turn (and not against teams from other subgroups). The teams played a game based on the well-known Prisoner's Dilemma (Tucker, 1950) - the paradoxical "Bluegill Sunbass Game" (Binmore, 1999) with three Nash equilibria (two suboptimal equilibria with a pure strategy and an optimal equilibrium with a mixed, egotistical strategy (p= 1/2)). This game also features a Harsanyi equilibrium (based on constant compliance with a moral code and altruism by empathy: "do not unto others that which you would not have them do unto you"). How, then, was the game played? Two teams of 8 competed on a handball court. Each team wore a distinctive jersey. The game lasted 15 minutes and the players were allowed to touch the handball ball with their feet or hands. After each goal, each team had to return to its own half of the court. Players were allowed to score in either goal and thus cooperate with their teammates or not, as they saw fit. A goal against the nominally opposing team (a "guardian" strategy, by analogy with the Bluegill Sunbass Game) earned a point for everyone in the team. For an own goal (a "sneaker" strategy), only the scorer earned a point - hence the paradox. If all the members of a team work together to score a goal, everyone is happy (the Harsanyi solution). However, the situation was not balanced in the Nashian sense: each player had a reason to be disloyal to his/her team at the merest opportunity. But if everyone adopts a "sneaker" strategy, the game becomes a free-for-all and the chances of scoring become much slimmer. In a context in which doubt reigns as to the honesty of team members and "legal betrayals", what type of sportsperson will score the most goals? By analogy with the Bluegill Sunbass Game, we recorded direct motor interactions (passes and shots) based on either a "guardian" tactic (i.e. collaboration within the team) or a "sneaker" tactic (shots and passes against the player's designated team). So, was the group of team sports specialist more collaborative than the other two groups? The answer was no. A statistical analysis (difference from chance in a logistic regression) enabled us to draw three conclusions: ?For the team sports specialists, the Nash equilibrium (1950) was stronger than the Harsanyi equilibrium (1977). ?The sporting principles of equilibrium and exclusivity are not appropriate in the Bluegill Sunbass Game and are quickly abandoned by the team sports specialists. The latter are opportunists who focus solely on winning and do well out of it. ?The most altruistic players are the main losers in the Bluegill Sunbass Game: they keep the game alive but contribute to their own defeat. In our experiment, the most altruistic players tended to be the females and the individual sports specialists

La necesidad de una herramienta para medir el hambre en los hogares de la región

En septiembre del año 2000, los gobiernos de 189 países adoptaron en Naciones Unidas un acuerdo global para combatir la desigualdad y mejorar el desarrollo humano en el mundo, con un horizonte puesto en el año 2015. Una de sus metas en este compromiso, llamado ?Los Objetivos de Desarrollo del Milenio?, consiste en reducir la pobreza extrema a la mitad. Específicamente, las autoridades de la República Argentina acordaron ?erradicar la indigencia y el hambre? entre 1990 y 2015, con una meta adicional consistente en ?reducir la pobreza a menos del 20 ?. En tiempos de grandes diferencias entre las estadísticas oficiales ?que están indicando mejores condiciones de vida en estos últimos años??y los informes de la oposición, de las consultoras privadas y de la Iglesia ?los cuales exhiben una posición contraria?, se desprende que la preocupación por erradicar el hambre está implícitamente presente en todos los sectores. Dada la cercanía de la fecha establecida como límite, se considera de interés la posibilidad de construir un nuevo instrumento de medición: un indicador del hambre para el próximo quinquenio. Por la complejidad del tema, esta propuesta innovadora presenta lineamientos básicos tendientes a la elaboración de un indicador que pueda brindar un seguimiento del fenómeno del hambre en la región, como una alternativa ante la inexistencia de estadísticas oficiales actualizadas que lo midan. Para ello se sugiere un marco teórico inexistente, hasta donde se conoce, obligando a definir aspectos conceptuales de variables relevantes. Tener un conocimiento más riguroso sobre los hogares argentinos que padecen el flagelo del hambre y poder identificarlos permitirá una mejor distribución de los recursos y procurar, a no muy largo plazo, que ningún habitante se encuentre en situación de pobreza extrema

La necesidad de una herramienta para medir el hambre en los hogares de la región

En septiembre del año 2000, los gobiernos de 189 países adoptaron en Naciones Unidas un acuerdo global para combatir la desigualdad y mejorar el desarrollo humano en el mundo, con un horizonte puesto en el año 2015. Una de sus metas en este compromiso, llamado ?Los Objetivos de Desarrollo del Milenio?, consiste en reducir la pobreza extrema a la mitad. Específicamente, las autoridades de la República Argentina acordaron ?erradicar la indigencia y el hambre? entre 1990 y 2015, con una meta adicional consistente en ?reducir la pobreza a menos del 20 ?. En tiempos de grandes diferencias entre las estadísticas oficiales ?que están indicando mejores condiciones de vida en estos últimos años??y los informes de la oposición, de las consultoras privadas y de la Iglesia ?los cuales exhiben una posición contraria?, se desprende que la preocupación por erradicar el hambre está implícitamente presente en todos los sectores. Dada la cercanía de la fecha establecida como límite, se considera de interés la posibilidad de construir un nuevo instrumento de medición: un indicador del hambre para el próximo quinquenio. Por la complejidad del tema, esta propuesta innovadora presenta lineamientos básicos tendientes a la elaboración de un indicador que pueda brindar un seguimiento del fenómeno del hambre en la región, como una alternativa ante la inexistencia de estadísticas oficiales actualizadas que lo midan. Para ello se sugiere un marco teórico inexistente, hasta donde se conoce, obligando a definir aspectos conceptuales de variables relevantes. Tener un conocimiento más riguroso sobre los hogares argentinos que padecen el flagelo del hambre y poder identificarlos permitirá una mejor distribución de los recursos y procurar, a no muy largo plazo, que ningún habitante se encuentre en situación de pobreza extrema

La necesidad de una herramienta para medir el hambre en los hogares de la región

En septiembre del año 2000, los gobiernos de 189 países adoptaron en Naciones Unidas un acuerdo global para combatir la desigualdad y mejorar el desarrollo humano en el mundo, con un horizonte puesto en el año 2015. Una de sus metas en este compromiso, llamado ?Los Objetivos de Desarrollo del Milenio?, consiste en reducir la pobreza extrema a la mitad. Específicamente, las autoridades de la República Argentina acordaron ?erradicar la indigencia y el hambre? entre 1990 y 2015, con una meta adicional consistente en ?reducir la pobreza a menos del 20 ?. En tiempos de grandes diferencias entre las estadísticas oficiales ?que están indicando mejores condiciones de vida en estos últimos años??y los informes de la oposición, de las consultoras privadas y de la Iglesia ?los cuales exhiben una posición contraria?, se desprende que la preocupación por erradicar el hambre está implícitamente presente en todos los sectores. Dada la cercanía de la fecha establecida como límite, se considera de interés la posibilidad de construir un nuevo instrumento de medición: un indicador del hambre para el próximo quinquenio. Por la complejidad del tema, esta propuesta innovadora presenta lineamientos básicos tendientes a la elaboración de un indicador que pueda brindar un seguimiento del fenómeno del hambre en la región, como una alternativa ante la inexistencia de estadísticas oficiales actualizadas que lo midan. Para ello se sugiere un marco teórico inexistente, hasta donde se conoce, obligando a definir aspectos conceptuales de variables relevantes. Tener un conocimiento más riguroso sobre los hogares argentinos que padecen el flagelo del hambre y poder identificarlos permitirá una mejor distribución de los recursos y procurar, a no muy largo plazo, que ningún habitante se encuentre en situación de pobreza extrema