5 resultados para Morale.
em Memoria Académica - FaHCE, UNLP - Argentina
Resumo:
How do sportspeople succeed in a non-collaborative game? An illustration of a perverse side effect of altruism Are team sports specialists predisposed to collaboration? The scientific literature on this topic is divided. The present article attempts to end this debate by applying experimental game theory. We constituted three groups of volunteers (all students aged around 20): 25 team sports specialists; 23 individual sports specialists (gymnasts, track & field athletes and swimmers) and a control group of 24 non-sportspeople. Each subgroup was divided into 3 teams that played against each other in turn (and not against teams from other subgroups). The teams played a game based on the well-known Prisoner's Dilemma (Tucker, 1950) - the paradoxical "Bluegill Sunbass Game" (Binmore, 1999) with three Nash equilibria (two suboptimal equilibria with a pure strategy and an optimal equilibrium with a mixed, egotistical strategy (p= 1/2)). This game also features a Harsanyi equilibrium (based on constant compliance with a moral code and altruism by empathy: "do not unto others that which you would not have them do unto you"). How, then, was the game played? Two teams of 8 competed on a handball court. Each team wore a distinctive jersey. The game lasted 15 minutes and the players were allowed to touch the handball ball with their feet or hands. After each goal, each team had to return to its own half of the court. Players were allowed to score in either goal and thus cooperate with their teammates or not, as they saw fit. A goal against the nominally opposing team (a "guardian" strategy, by analogy with the Bluegill Sunbass Game) earned a point for everyone in the team. For an own goal (a "sneaker" strategy), only the scorer earned a point - hence the paradox. If all the members of a team work together to score a goal, everyone is happy (the Harsanyi solution). However, the situation was not balanced in the Nashian sense: each player had a reason to be disloyal to his/her team at the merest opportunity. But if everyone adopts a "sneaker" strategy, the game becomes a free-for-all and the chances of scoring become much slimmer. In a context in which doubt reigns as to the honesty of team members and "legal betrayals", what type of sportsperson will score the most goals? By analogy with the Bluegill Sunbass Game, we recorded direct motor interactions (passes and shots) based on either a "guardian" tactic (i.e. collaboration within the team) or a "sneaker" tactic (shots and passes against the player's designated team). So, was the group of team sports specialist more collaborative than the other two groups? The answer was no. A statistical analysis (difference from chance in a logistic regression) enabled us to draw three conclusions: ?For the team sports specialists, the Nash equilibrium (1950) was stronger than the Harsanyi equilibrium (1977). ?The sporting principles of equilibrium and exclusivity are not appropriate in the Bluegill Sunbass Game and are quickly abandoned by the team sports specialists. The latter are opportunists who focus solely on winning and do well out of it. ?The most altruistic players are the main losers in the Bluegill Sunbass Game: they keep the game alive but contribute to their own defeat. In our experiment, the most altruistic players tended to be the females and the individual sports specialists
Resumo:
El propósito de este trabajo es investigar los motivos, anhelos, sueños, deseos que llevan a un grupo de entre 20 y 25 ex presos políticos a reunirse semanalmente en el local del sindicato Luz y Fuerza, Córdoba. Optamos por entrevistar a quienes daban la sensación de ser más participativos o más explícitos, en la elección procuramos que hubiesen casi por igual miembros de las dos organizaciones mayoritarias en el pasado: Montoneros y Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores. El celo a la hora de elegir se entronca con las subculturas que emergieron de las organizaciones. Otro aspecto observado es la cuestión de género, mujeres y hombres, equitativamente incorporados, se constituyeron en narradores.2 En la ciudad mediterránea hubo alrededor de dos mil detenidos por causas políticas a partir de la dictadura que iniciara Jorge Rafael Videla. La curiosidad social es acicateada por el número exiguo de ex-represaliados que constituyen la comisión de presos políticos, que entre otras tareas peticiona ante las autoridades solicitando reivindicaciones a raíz de su condición de ex detenidos, organizan eventos sociales y políticos, gestionan los ex centros de detención convertidos en "museos de la memoria", impulsan los juicios contra los ex represores, editan publicaciones. Concurrimos a las reuniones semanales, a asados, "locreadas"; empleamos en las investigaciones la observación participante. La participación se dio en eventos, en compartir ruedas de mate en la casa de los entrevistados, íntimas ruedas de café, por un fenómeno de indexicalidad en relación con el discurso ideológico pudimos avanzar en la profundidad de la conversación. Además, de las entrevistas en profundidad, analizamos material periodístico y material escrito por los detenidos; cuando la emoción del entrevistado dificultaba la conversación, en algunos casos nos remitieron a elaboraciones suyas sobre la situación planteada.. Nos favoreció, en el trabajo, el hecho de haber participado en la vida política, y el tener familiares que lucharon junto a los ex-represaliados. A pesar de ello no fue fácil llegar a subjetividades que hacía largo tiempo se hallaban abroqueladas. Mead e Erving Goffman nos acompañaron en el camino de reconocimiento de los selfs en la dramaturgia montada en el local de Luz y Fuerza
Resumo:
How do sportspeople succeed in a non-collaborative game? An illustration of a perverse side effect of altruism Are team sports specialists predisposed to collaboration? The scientific literature on this topic is divided. The present article attempts to end this debate by applying experimental game theory. We constituted three groups of volunteers (all students aged around 20): 25 team sports specialists; 23 individual sports specialists (gymnasts, track & field athletes and swimmers) and a control group of 24 non-sportspeople. Each subgroup was divided into 3 teams that played against each other in turn (and not against teams from other subgroups). The teams played a game based on the well-known Prisoner's Dilemma (Tucker, 1950) - the paradoxical "Bluegill Sunbass Game" (Binmore, 1999) with three Nash equilibria (two suboptimal equilibria with a pure strategy and an optimal equilibrium with a mixed, egotistical strategy (p= 1/2)). This game also features a Harsanyi equilibrium (based on constant compliance with a moral code and altruism by empathy: "do not unto others that which you would not have them do unto you"). How, then, was the game played? Two teams of 8 competed on a handball court. Each team wore a distinctive jersey. The game lasted 15 minutes and the players were allowed to touch the handball ball with their feet or hands. After each goal, each team had to return to its own half of the court. Players were allowed to score in either goal and thus cooperate with their teammates or not, as they saw fit. A goal against the nominally opposing team (a "guardian" strategy, by analogy with the Bluegill Sunbass Game) earned a point for everyone in the team. For an own goal (a "sneaker" strategy), only the scorer earned a point - hence the paradox. If all the members of a team work together to score a goal, everyone is happy (the Harsanyi solution). However, the situation was not balanced in the Nashian sense: each player had a reason to be disloyal to his/her team at the merest opportunity. But if everyone adopts a "sneaker" strategy, the game becomes a free-for-all and the chances of scoring become much slimmer. In a context in which doubt reigns as to the honesty of team members and "legal betrayals", what type of sportsperson will score the most goals? By analogy with the Bluegill Sunbass Game, we recorded direct motor interactions (passes and shots) based on either a "guardian" tactic (i.e. collaboration within the team) or a "sneaker" tactic (shots and passes against the player's designated team). So, was the group of team sports specialist more collaborative than the other two groups? The answer was no. A statistical analysis (difference from chance in a logistic regression) enabled us to draw three conclusions: ?For the team sports specialists, the Nash equilibrium (1950) was stronger than the Harsanyi equilibrium (1977). ?The sporting principles of equilibrium and exclusivity are not appropriate in the Bluegill Sunbass Game and are quickly abandoned by the team sports specialists. The latter are opportunists who focus solely on winning and do well out of it. ?The most altruistic players are the main losers in the Bluegill Sunbass Game: they keep the game alive but contribute to their own defeat. In our experiment, the most altruistic players tended to be the females and the individual sports specialists
Resumo:
El propósito de este trabajo es investigar los motivos, anhelos, sueños, deseos que llevan a un grupo de entre 20 y 25 ex presos políticos a reunirse semanalmente en el local del sindicato Luz y Fuerza, Córdoba. Optamos por entrevistar a quienes daban la sensación de ser más participativos o más explícitos, en la elección procuramos que hubiesen casi por igual miembros de las dos organizaciones mayoritarias en el pasado: Montoneros y Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores. El celo a la hora de elegir se entronca con las subculturas que emergieron de las organizaciones. Otro aspecto observado es la cuestión de género, mujeres y hombres, equitativamente incorporados, se constituyeron en narradores.2 En la ciudad mediterránea hubo alrededor de dos mil detenidos por causas políticas a partir de la dictadura que iniciara Jorge Rafael Videla. La curiosidad social es acicateada por el número exiguo de ex-represaliados que constituyen la comisión de presos políticos, que entre otras tareas peticiona ante las autoridades solicitando reivindicaciones a raíz de su condición de ex detenidos, organizan eventos sociales y políticos, gestionan los ex centros de detención convertidos en "museos de la memoria", impulsan los juicios contra los ex represores, editan publicaciones. Concurrimos a las reuniones semanales, a asados, "locreadas"; empleamos en las investigaciones la observación participante. La participación se dio en eventos, en compartir ruedas de mate en la casa de los entrevistados, íntimas ruedas de café, por un fenómeno de indexicalidad en relación con el discurso ideológico pudimos avanzar en la profundidad de la conversación. Además, de las entrevistas en profundidad, analizamos material periodístico y material escrito por los detenidos; cuando la emoción del entrevistado dificultaba la conversación, en algunos casos nos remitieron a elaboraciones suyas sobre la situación planteada.. Nos favoreció, en el trabajo, el hecho de haber participado en la vida política, y el tener familiares que lucharon junto a los ex-represaliados. A pesar de ello no fue fácil llegar a subjetividades que hacía largo tiempo se hallaban abroqueladas. Mead e Erving Goffman nos acompañaron en el camino de reconocimiento de los selfs en la dramaturgia montada en el local de Luz y Fuerza
Resumo:
How do sportspeople succeed in a non-collaborative game? An illustration of a perverse side effect of altruism Are team sports specialists predisposed to collaboration? The scientific literature on this topic is divided. The present article attempts to end this debate by applying experimental game theory. We constituted three groups of volunteers (all students aged around 20): 25 team sports specialists; 23 individual sports specialists (gymnasts, track & field athletes and swimmers) and a control group of 24 non-sportspeople. Each subgroup was divided into 3 teams that played against each other in turn (and not against teams from other subgroups). The teams played a game based on the well-known Prisoner's Dilemma (Tucker, 1950) - the paradoxical "Bluegill Sunbass Game" (Binmore, 1999) with three Nash equilibria (two suboptimal equilibria with a pure strategy and an optimal equilibrium with a mixed, egotistical strategy (p= 1/2)). This game also features a Harsanyi equilibrium (based on constant compliance with a moral code and altruism by empathy: "do not unto others that which you would not have them do unto you"). How, then, was the game played? Two teams of 8 competed on a handball court. Each team wore a distinctive jersey. The game lasted 15 minutes and the players were allowed to touch the handball ball with their feet or hands. After each goal, each team had to return to its own half of the court. Players were allowed to score in either goal and thus cooperate with their teammates or not, as they saw fit. A goal against the nominally opposing team (a "guardian" strategy, by analogy with the Bluegill Sunbass Game) earned a point for everyone in the team. For an own goal (a "sneaker" strategy), only the scorer earned a point - hence the paradox. If all the members of a team work together to score a goal, everyone is happy (the Harsanyi solution). However, the situation was not balanced in the Nashian sense: each player had a reason to be disloyal to his/her team at the merest opportunity. But if everyone adopts a "sneaker" strategy, the game becomes a free-for-all and the chances of scoring become much slimmer. In a context in which doubt reigns as to the honesty of team members and "legal betrayals", what type of sportsperson will score the most goals? By analogy with the Bluegill Sunbass Game, we recorded direct motor interactions (passes and shots) based on either a "guardian" tactic (i.e. collaboration within the team) or a "sneaker" tactic (shots and passes against the player's designated team). So, was the group of team sports specialist more collaborative than the other two groups? The answer was no. A statistical analysis (difference from chance in a logistic regression) enabled us to draw three conclusions: ?For the team sports specialists, the Nash equilibrium (1950) was stronger than the Harsanyi equilibrium (1977). ?The sporting principles of equilibrium and exclusivity are not appropriate in the Bluegill Sunbass Game and are quickly abandoned by the team sports specialists. The latter are opportunists who focus solely on winning and do well out of it. ?The most altruistic players are the main losers in the Bluegill Sunbass Game: they keep the game alive but contribute to their own defeat. In our experiment, the most altruistic players tended to be the females and the individual sports specialists
