Dynamic Effects of Currency Depreciation on Stock Market Returns during the Asian Financial Crisis

The current international integration of financial markets provides a channel for currency depreciation to affect stock prices. Moreover, the recent financial crisis in Asia with its accompanying exchange rate volatility affords a case study to examine that channel. This paper applies a bivariate GARCH-M model of the reduced form of stock market returns to investigate empirically the effects of daily currency depreciation on stock market returns for five newly emerging East Asian stock markets during the Asian financial crisis. The evidence shows that the conditional variances of stock market returns and depreciation rates exhibit time-varying characteristics for all countries. Domestic currency depreciation and its uncertainty adversely affects stock market returns across countries. The significant effects of foreign exchange market events on stock market returns suggest that international fund managers who invest in the newly emerging East Asian stock markets must evaluate the value and stability of the domestic currency as a part of their stock market investment decisions.

Asymmetric Information, Tax Evasion and Alternative Instruments of Government Revenue

Using a pure-exchange overlapping generations model, characterized with tax evasion and information asymmetry between the government (the social planner) and the financial intermediaries, we try and seek for the optimal tax and seigniorage plans, derived from the welfare maximizing objective of the social planner. We show that irrespective of whether the economy is characterized by tax evasion, or asymmetric information, a benevolent social planner, maximizing welfare and simultaneously financing the budget constraint, should optimally rely on explicit rather than implicit taxation.

A Generic Model of Financial Repression

The paper develops a growth model in an overlapping generations framework of a financially repressed small open economy, and analyzes the effects of financial liberalization. The following observations are made: An increase (decrease) of interest rate (reserve requirements) reduces (increases) the steady-state stock of capital and the trade balance, but improves (deteriorates) the level of foreign exchange reserves. However, financial liberalization, in any form, is always welfare-improving. The paper, thus, advocates financial liberalization policies to be oriented towards reduction of reserve requirements rather than interest rate deregulation, if foreign reserve holding is not in a critical position.

The Economic Case for Fiscal Federalism in Scotland

In this paper we consider the case for assigning tax revenues to Scotland, by which we mean that taxes levied on Scottish tax bases should be returned to the Scottish budget. The budget, however, would continue to be supplemented by transfers from the Westminster budget. This arrangement differs from the current situation whereby public spending is largely financed by a bloc grant from Westminster. Our suggestion falls short of full fiscal federalism for Scotland . meaning that Scotland had control over choice of tax base and of tax rates, and fiscal transfers from Westminster would be minimal. We use propositions drawn from the theory of fiscal federalism to argue for a smaller vertical imbalance between taxes retained in Scotland and public spending in Scotland. A closer matching of spending with taxes would better signal to beneficiaries the true costs of public spending in terms of taxes raised. It would also create more complete incentives for politicians to provide public goods and services in quantities and at qualities that voters are actually willing to pay for. Under the current bloc grant system, the marginal tax cost of spending does not enter into political agents. calculations as spending is out of a fixed total budget. Moreover, the Scottish electorate is hindered in signaling its desire for local public goods and services since the size of the total budget is determined by a rigid formula set by Westminster. At the present time we reject proposals for full fiscal federalism because in sharply reducing vertical imbalance in the Scottish budget, it is likely to worsen horizontal balance between Scotland and the other UK regions. Horizontal balance occurs where similarly situated regions enjoy the same per capita level of public goods and services at the same per capita tax cost. The complete removal of the bloc grant under full fiscal federalism would remove the mechanism that currently promotes horizontal equity in the UK. Variability in own-source tax revenues creates other problems with full fiscal federalism. Taxes derived from North Sea oil would constitute a large proportion of Scottish taxes, but these are known to be volatile in the face of variable oil prices and the pound-dollar exchange rate. At the present time variability in oil tax revenue is absorbed by Westminster. Scotland is insulated through the bloc grant. This risk sharing mechanism would be lost with full fiscal federalism. It is true that Scotland could turn to financial markets to tide itself over oil tax revenue downturns, but as a much smaller and less diversified financial entity than the UK as a whole it would probably have to borrow on less favorable terms than can Westminster. Scotland would have to bear this extra cost itself. Also, with full fiscal federalism it is difficult to see how the Scottish budget could be used as a macroeconomic stabilizer. At present, tax revenue downturns in Scotland - together with the steady bloc grant - are absorbed through an increase in vertical imbalance. This acts as an automatic stabilizer for the Scottish economy. No such mechanism would exist under full fiscal federalism. The borrowing alternative would still exist but on the less favorable terms - as with borrowing to finance oil tax shortfalls.