An Equilibrium Model of Lawmaking

This paper embeds a model of lawmaking in an equilibrium framework in which the demand for trials is rationed by court delay. The lawmaking process depends on a combination of selective litigation, judicial bias, and precedent. The steady state equilibrium of the model determines both the length of delay and the distribution of legal rules. Comparative statics show that an increase in the supply of trials reduces delay but may or may not increase the proportion of efficient rules. An increase in the fraction of judges biased in favor of the efficient rule, however, will likely improve efficiency on both counts.

Stationary Markovian Equilibrium in Overlapping Generation Models with Stochastic Nonclassical Production

This paper provides new sufficient conditions for the existence, computation via successive approximations, and stability of Markovian equilibrium decision processes for a large class of OLG models with stochastic nonclassical production. Our notion of stability is existence of stationary Markovian equilibrium. With a nonclassical production, our economies encompass a large class of OLG models with public policy, valued fiat money, production externalities, and Markov shocks to production. Our approach combines aspects of both topological and order theoretic fixed point theory, and provides the basis of globally stable numerical iteration procedures for computing extremal Markovian equilibrium objects. In addition to new theoretical results on existence and computation, we provide some monotone comparative statics results on the space of economies.