The Demand for Power Diffusion: A Case Study of the 2005 Constitutional Referendum Voting in Kenya

Recent studies on the history of economic development demonstrate that concentration of power on a monarch or a ruling coalition impedes economic growth and that institutional changes that diffuse power, though beneficial to the society in general, are opposed by some social groups. In November 2005, Kenyans rejected a proposed constitution primarily because it did not reduce the powers of the executive to any significant degree. Using data of voting patterns in the constitutional referendum and following the rational choice framework, I estimate a model of the demand for power diffusion and demonstrate that groups voting decisions depend on expected gains and likelihood of monopolizing power. The results also reveal the importance of ethnic divisions in hindering the power diffusion process, and therefore the study establishes a channel through which ethnic fragmentation impacts on economic development.

Does the Federal Reserve Follow a Non-Linear Taylor Rule?

The Taylor rule has become one of the most studied strategies for monetary policy. Yet, little is known whether the Federal Reserve follows a non-linear Taylor rule. This paper employs the smooth transition regression model and asks the question: does the Federal Reserve change its policy-rule according to the level of inflation and/or the output gap? I find that the Federal Reserve does follow a non-linear Taylor rule and, more importantly, that the Federal Reserve followed a non-linear Taylor rule during the golden era of monetary policy, 1985-2005, and a linear Taylor rule throughout the dark age of monetary policy, 1960-1979. Thus, good monetary policy is associated with a non-linear Taylor rule: once inflation approaches a certain threshold, the Federal Reserve adjusts its policy-rule and begins to respond more forcefully to inflation.

The Aggregate Demand for Private Health Insurance Coverage in the U.S.

This paper estimates the aggregate demand for private health insurance coverage in the U.S. using an error-correction model and by recognizing that people are without private health insurance for voluntary, structural, frictional, and cyclical reasons and because of public alternatives. Insurance coverage is measured both by the percentage of the population enrolled in private health insurance plans and the completeness of the insurance coverage. Annual data for the period 1966-1999 are used and both short and long run price and income elasticities of demand are estimated. The empirical findings indicate that both private insurance enrollment and completeness are relatively inelastic with respect to changes in price and income in the short and long run. Moreover, private health insurance enrollment is found to be inversely related to the poverty rate, particularly in the short-run. Finally, our results suggest that an increase in the number cyclically uninsured generates less of a welfare loss than an increase in the structurally uninsured.