Now You See it, Now You Don't: Why Do Real Estate Agents Withhold Available Houses from Black Customers?

Potential home buyers may initiate contact with a real estate agent by asking to see a particular advertised house. This paper asks whether an agent's response to such a request depends on the race of the potential buyer or on whether the house is located in an integrated neighborhood. We build on previous research about the causes of discrimination in housing by using data from fair housing audits, a matched-pair technique for comparing the treatment of equllay qualified black and white home buyers. However, we shift the focus from differences in the treatment of paired buyers to agent decisions concerning an individual housing unit using a sample of all houses seen during he 1989 Housing Discrimination study. We estimate a random effect, multinomial logit model to explain a real estate agent's joint decisions concerning whether to show each unit to a black auditor and to a white auditor. We find evidence that agents withhold houses in suburban, integrated neighborhoods from all customers (redlining), that agents' decisions to show houses in integrated neighborhoods are not the same for black and white customers (steering), and that the houses agents show are more likely to deviate from the initial request when the customeris black than when the customer is white. These deviations are consistent with the possibility that agents act upon the belief that some types of transactions are relatively unlikely for black customers (statistical discrimination).

Economies of Scale and Cost Efficiencies: A Panel-Data Stochastic-Frontier Analysis of Real Estate Investment Trusts

This paper extends the existing research on real estate investment trust (REIT) operating efficiencies. We estimate a stochastic-frontier panel-data model specifying a translog cost function, covering 1995 to 2003. The results disagree with previous research in that we find little evidence of scale economies and some evidence of scale diseconomies. Moreover, we also generally find smaller inefficiencies than those shown by other REIT studies. Contrary to previous research, the results also show that self-management of a REIT associates with more inefficiency when we measure output with assets. When we use revenue to measure output, selfmanagement associates with less inefficiency. Also contrary with previous research, higher leverage associates with more efficiency. The results further suggest that inefficiency increases over time in three of our four specifications.

Cost Improvements, Returns to Scale, and Cost Inefficiencies for Real Estate Investment Trusts

This paper extends the existing research on real estate investment trust (REIT) operating efficiencies. We estimate stochastic-frontier, panel-data models specifying a translog cost function. The specified model updates the cost frontier with new information as it becomes available over time. The model can identify frontier cost improvements, returns to scale, and cost inefficiencies over time. The results disagree with most previous research in that we find no evidence of scale economies and some evidence of scale diseconomies. Moreover, we also generally find smaller inefficiencies than those shown by other REIT studies. Contrary to previous research, higher leverage associates with more efficiency.