Ontology and Realism about Modality

A philosopher who thinks substantive necessities obtain in re, this paper argues, need not believe in non-actual worlds, or maximal consistent sets of propositions, but merely in properties. For most properties, on even the sparsest property realism, are flanked by contraries with which they cannot be co-instantiated. True, Armstrong has shown that the impossibility that a property bearer should bear each of two contraries is sometimes just the impossibility that the bearer should be identical with its own proper part-hence is no substantive impossibility. But for many genuine contraries Armstrong's analysis fails; their incompatibility cannot be reduced to facts of identity. The main examples are dispositional properties, so the paper also argues that being dispositional is no bar to a property's being real in its own right.

Income Inequality in the 1990s: Re-Forging a Lost Relationship?

Using data from March Current Population Surveys we find gains from economic growth over the 1990s business cycle (1989-2000) were more equitably distributed than over the 1980s business cycle (1979-1989) using summary inequality measures as well as kernel density estimations. The entire distribution of household size-adjusted income moved upwards in the 1990s with profound improvements for African Americans, single mothers and those living in households receiving welfare. Most gains occurred over the growth period 1993-2000. Improvements in average income and income inequity over the latter period are reminiscent of gains seen in the first three decades after World War II.