Street-Ball: The Myth of the Ghetto Basketball Star

In recent decades, countless scholars have examined the developing trend of African American dominance in United States’ professional sports. Many have hypothesized that this over-representation is caused by the presumed reliance on sports as an avenue out of poverty for the African American youths. This trend, it is believed, has a highly detrimental effect the African American community. In actuality, this argument is flawed because it works under the stereotypical assumption that the overwhelming majority of African Americans come from abject poverty. To dispel this fallacy, the author has analyzed the upbringings of each All-National Basketball League First Team player over the past thirty years. The author discovered that while the majority of the players selected were African American, only a small percentage of these athletes were raised in a poverty-stricken environment. Logically, this would not be the case if poor African Americans relied more heavily on sports than middle-class African Americans. This data proves that stereotypes, not empirical evidence, are the substance of nearly every previous study conducted on the topic.

A Principal-Agent Model of Contracting in Major League Baseball

Traditional economic analyses of the reserve clause in major league baseball view it as having arisen from the superior bargaining of owners compared to players. This article interprets it instead as promoting efficient investment by teams in player development, given the transferability of player skills to other teams. Using a principal-agent framework, the article shows that limited player mobility emerges as part of the optimal contract between players (principals) and teams (agents).

The Old Ball Game: Organization of Nineteenth Century Professional Base Ball Clubs

The first professional base ball clubs came in two varieties: stock clubs, which paid their players fixed wages, and player cooperatives, in which players shared the proceeds after expenses. We argue that stock clubs were formed with players of known ability, while co-ops were formed with players of unknown ability. Although residual claimancy served to screen out players of inferior ability in co-ops, the process was imperfect due to the team production problem. Based on this argument, we suggest that co-ops functioned as an early minor league system where untried players could seek to prove themselves and eventually move up to wage teams. Empirical analysis of data on player performance and experience in early professional base ball provides support for the theory.