Deterrence, Incapacitation, and Repeat Offenders

This paper develops an economic model of criminal enforcement that combines the goals of deterrence and incapacitation. Potential offenders commit an initial criminal act if the present value of net private gains is positive. A fraction of these offenders become habitual and commit further crimes immediately upon release from their initial prison term (if any). The optimal punishment scheme in this setting generally involves a finite prison term for first-time offenders (based on the goal of deterrence), and an infinite (life) sentence for repeat offenders (based on the goal of incapacitation).

Test, Edit, Repeat: Steps to Improve Your Web Site.

Presents ways to improve library Web sites. Description of the Hampshire College library Web site and how it is an integral part of the college's reference service; Usability analysis of Web sites; How to apply what librarians learn from usability analysis; Importance of testing; How to measure success. INSETS: Test Questions; Usability Guidelines.

A Simple Theory of Increasing Penalties for Repeat Offenders

A feature of many penal codes is that punishments are more severe for repeat offenders, yet economic models have had a hard time providing a theoretical justification for this practice. This paper offers an explanation based on the wage penalty suffered by individuals convicted of crime. While this penalty probably deters some first-timers from committing crimes, it actually hampers deterrence of repeat offenders because of their diminished employments opportunities. We show that in this setting, an escalating penalty scheme is optimal and time consistent.