Transfer Pricing in the Decentralized Multinational Corporation

This paper considers how the multinational corporation's transfer price responds to changes in international corporate effective tax rates. It extends the decentralized decision-making analysis of transfer pricing in the context of different tax rates. It adopts and extends Bond's (1980) model of the decentralized multinational corporation that assumes centralized transfer pricing. The direction of transfer price change is as expected, while the magnitude of change is likely to be less than predicted by the Horst (1971), centralized decision-making model. The paper extends the model further by assuming negotiated transfer pricing, where the analysis is partitioned into perfect and imperfect information cases. The negotiated transfer pricing result reverts to the Horst (1971), or centralized decision-making, result, under perfect information. Under imperfect information, the centralized decision-making result obtains when top management successfully informs division general managers or it successfully implements a non-monetary reward scheme to encourage division general managers to cooperate. Under simplifying assumptions, centralized decision-making dominates decentralized decision-making, while negotiated transfer pricing weakly dominates centralized transfer pricing.

A Note on Optimal Care by Wealth-Constrained Injurers

This paper clarifies the relationship between an injurer's wealth level and his care choice by highlighting the distinction between monetary and non-monetary care. When care is non-monetary, wealth-constrained injurers generally take less than optimal care, and care is increasing in their wealth level under both strict liability and negligence. In contrast, when care is monetary, injurers may take too much or too little care under strict liability, and care is not strictly increasing in injurer wealth. Under negligence, the relationship between injurer care and wealth is similar in the two formulations. However, when litigation costs are added to the model, the relationship between injurer care and wealth becomes non-monotonic under both liability rules.

Does the Federal Reserve Follow a Non-Linear Taylor Rule?

The Taylor rule has become one of the most studied strategies for monetary policy. Yet, little is known whether the Federal Reserve follows a non-linear Taylor rule. This paper employs the smooth transition regression model and asks the question: does the Federal Reserve change its policy-rule according to the level of inflation and/or the output gap? I find that the Federal Reserve does follow a non-linear Taylor rule and, more importantly, that the Federal Reserve followed a non-linear Taylor rule during the golden era of monetary policy, 1985-2005, and a linear Taylor rule throughout the dark age of monetary policy, 1960-1979. Thus, good monetary policy is associated with a non-linear Taylor rule: once inflation approaches a certain threshold, the Federal Reserve adjusts its policy-rule and begins to respond more forcefully to inflation.