Global Supervenience on Microphysics

Many philosophers would agree with the claim that the truths reported by the special sciences supervene on the ways the world is at the level of the fundamental particles of physics. At the least this supervenience claim denies independent variability for the truths of the special sciences—but many would add that the ways the world is, microphysically, generate all the special science truths. Call this “Global Supervenience on Microphysics”. What it is for a special science claim to be true, says GSM, just is for the world to be a certain way microphysically. But which way? The popular suggestion is that the microphysical truth-condition for a given special-science statement is whatever microphysical arrangement it is, that renders true the causal import of the special-science statement. I argue that there is no fact of the matter as to which microphysical arrangement this is, and conclude that GSM may be untenable.

Physicalism and the Fallacy of Composition

Physicalism, as in this paper, holds that every instance of causation reported by the special sciences is shadowed, even rivaled, by causation at the level of microphysics. The reported "cause" is embodied in one massive collection of microparticle events; the "effect" in another; the former brings about the latter by laws of physics. This paper argues that while individual events in the "cause" collection bring about individual events in the "effect" collection, it does not follow, and is unbelievable, that the "cause" collection itself brings anything about. Causings reported by the special sciences can be traced only at that level.