Family Court Judges' Training, Background, and Child Development Knowledge: Associations with Child Custody Decision Making

Family court judges are often asked to make inferences about - or directly interview children to ascertain - children's custody preferences and their maturity to express such preferences. These estimates of children's developmental maturity are important to the judges' considerations of children's "best interests" in custody cases. The research literature describing family court judges' background, education, training, and knowledge about child development is scant. With appropriate child development knowledge, judges should be better able to identify the developmental stages at which children have the cognitive and social capabilities to communicate directly their placement wishes or concerns. The current study is the first to examine judges' estimates of - and actual tests of - their child development knowledge, their training/education, and their application of this knowledge to their decisions to involve children as participants in contested custody cases.

Determinants and Effects of Maturity Mismatches in Emerging Markets: Evidence from Bank Level Data

Despite the extensive work on currency mismatches, research on the determinants and effects of maturity mismatches is scarce. In this paper I show that emerging market maturity mismatches are negatively affected by capital inflows and price volatilities. Furthermore, I find that banks with low maturity mismatches are more profitable during crisis periods but less profitable otherwise. The later result implies that banks face a tradeoff between higher returns and risk, hence channeling short term capital into long term loans is caused by cronyism and implicit guarantees rather than the depth of the financial market. The positive relationship between maturity mismatches and price volatility, on the other hand, shows that the banks of countries with high exchange rate and interest rate volatilities can not, or choose not to hedge themselves. These results follow from a panel regression on a data set I constructed by merging bank level data with aggregate data. This is advantageous over traditional studies which focus only on aggregate data.

The Optimal Response to Default: Renegotiation or Extended Maturity?

This paper reinforces the argument of Harding and Sirmans (2002) that the observed preference of lenders for extended maturity rather than renegotiation of the principle in the case of loan default is due to the superior incentive properties of the former. Specifically, borrowers have a greater incentive to avoid default under extended maturity because it reduces the likelihood that they will be able to escape paying off the full loan balance. Thus, although extended maturity leaves open the possibility of foreclosure, it will be preferred to renegotiation as long as the dead weight loss from foreclosure is not too large.