Productivity Growth and Efficiency in Indian Banking: A Comparison of Public, Private, and Foreign Banks

India's public sector banks (PSBs) are compared unfavorably with their private sector counterparts, domestic and foreign. This comparison rests, for the most part, on financial measures of performance, and such a comparison provides much of the rationale for privatization of PSBs.In this paper, we attempt a comparison between PSBs and their private sector counterparts based on measures of productivity that use quantities of outputs and inputs. We employ two measures of productivity: Tornqvist and Malmquist total factor productivity growth. We attempt these comparisons over the period 1992-2000, comparing PSBs with both domestic private and foreign banks. Out of a total of four comparisons we have made, there are no differences in three cases, PSBs do better in two, and foreign banks in one. To put it differently, PSBs are seen to be at a disadvantage in only one out of six comparisons. It is difficult, therefore, to sustain the proposition that efficiency and productivity have been lower in public sector banks relative to their peers in the private sector.

Punishing the Innocent along with the Guilty: The Economics of Individual versus Group Punishment

Standard models of law enforcement involve the apprehension and punishment of a single suspect, but in many contexts, punishment is actually imposed on an entire group known to contain the offender. The advantages of .group punishment. are that the offender is punished with certainty and detection costs are saved. The disadvantage is that innocent individuals are punished. We compare individual and group punishment when social welfare depends on fairness, and when it depends on deterrence. We show that group punishment may dominate in the former case if the detection technology is ineffective but never in the latter case. We discuss our results in the context of several examples.

Wage Premia in Employment Clusters: Agglomeration Economies or Worker Heterogeneity?

The correlation between wage premia and concentrations of firm activity may arise due to agglomeration economies or workers sorting by unobserved productivity. A worker's residential location is used as a proxy for their unobservable productivity attributes in order to test whether estimated work location wage premia are robust to the inclusion of these controls. Further, in a locational equilibrium, identical workers must receive equivalent compensation so that after controlling for residential location (housing prices) and commutes workers must be paid the same wages and only wage premia arising from unobserved productivity differences should remain unexplained. The models in this paper are estimated using a sample of male workers residing in 33 large metropolitan areas drawn from the 5% Public Use Microdata Sample (PUMS) from the 2000 U.S. Decennial Census. We find that wages are higher when an individual works in a location that has more workers or a greater density of workers. These agglomeration effects are robust to the inclusion of residential location controls and disappear with the inclusion of commute time suggesting that the effects are not caused by unobserved differences in worker productivity. Extended model specifications suggest that wages increase with the education level of nearby workers and the concentration of workers in an individual's own industry or occupation.

Technical Efficiency in the Indian Textiles Industry: A Nonparametric Analysis of Firm-Level Data

The Indian textiles industry is now at the crossroads with the phasing out of quota regime that prevailed under the Multi-Fiber Agreement (MFA) until the end of 2004. In the face of a full integration of the textiles sector in the WTO, maintaining and enhancing productive efficiency is a precondition for competitiveness of the Indian firms in the new liberalized world market. In this paper we use data obtained from the Annual Survey of Industries for a number of years to measure the levels of technical efficiency in the Indian textiles industry at the firm level. We use both a grand frontier applicable to all firms and a group frontier specific to firms from any individual state, ownership, or organization type in order to evaluate their efficiencies. This permits us to separately identify how locational, proprietary, and organizational characteristics of a firm affect its performance.