Rights at Risk: Refugees in the New South Africa

This thesis seeks to analyze the relationship between public attitudes toward refugees in a refugee receiving state and the realization of the legal rights afforded refugees (de facto rights). I hypothesize that the more negative a host culture is toward refugees, the less refugees are able to realize their rights. Conversely, the more positive a host culture is toward refugees, the more refugees are able to realize their rights. I test the hypothesis through a case study of refugee populations in Cape Town, South Africa, based on research conducted from May to June 2007. The orientation (positive or negative) of the host culture's perceptions toward a refugee group (Independent Variable) is measured through: (1) a coded content analysis of the South African media, (2) a coded content analysis of semi-structured interviews, and (3) an assessment of secondary source public opinion surveys and reports. The realization of refugee rights (Dependent Variable) is operationalized as a function of two rights: (1) the right to personal physical integrity and (2) the right to protection from unlawful detention. These rights are measured by coding (1) media reports and (2) interviews, and by (3) assessing NGO reports and secondary source public opinion surveys. My empirical data shows that the cultural orientation toward refugees is not overwhelmingly negative, and the realization of rights is not conclusively "low." However, the frequency of data coded "negative" and "low" versus "positive" or "high" suggest that South Africans regard refugees somewhat negatively and that rights are not fully realized. This finding is strengthened by the analysis of secondary sources and field notes.

Competition and the Legal Environment: Intellectual Property Rights in the Early American Film Industry

No abstract available.

Beyond Racial Precedents: Loving v. Virginia as an Appropriate Legal Model and Strategy for Same-Sex Marriage Litigation

This thesis explores how LGBT marriage activists and lawyers have employed a racial interpretation of due process and equal protection in recent same-sex marriage litigation. Special attention is paid to the Supreme Court's opinion in Loving v. Virginia, the landmark case that declared anti-miscegenation laws unconstitutional. By exploring the use of racial precedent in same-sex marriage litigation and its treatment in state court cases, this thesis critiques the racial interpretation of due process and equal protection that became the basis for LGBT marriage briefs and litigation, and attempts to answer the question of whether a racial interpretation of due process and equal protection is an appropriate model for same-sex marriage litigation both constitutionally and strategically. The existing scholarly literature fails to explore how this issue has been treated in case briefs, which are very important elements in any legal proceeding. I will argue that through an analysis of recent state court briefs in Massachusetts and Connecticut, Loving acts as logical precedent for the legalization of same-sex marriage. I also find, more significantly, that although this racial interpretation of due process and equal protection represented by Loving can be seen as an appropriate model for same-sex marriage litigation constitutionally, questions remain about its strategic effectiveness, as LGBT lawyers have moved away from race in some arguments in these briefs. Indeed, a racial interpretation of Due Process and Equal Protection doctrine imposes certain limits on same-sex marriage litigation, of which we are warned by some Critical Race theorists, Latino Critical Legal theorists, and other scholars. In order to fully incorporate a discussion of race into the argument for legalizing same-sex marriage, the dangers posed by the black/white binary of race relations must first be overcome.

Perpetual Conflict or Compromise? The Cost of Domestic Legitimacy in the Realm of Women's Human Rights: A Case Study on the Right to an Abortion

With its turbulent and volatile legal evolution, the right to an abortion in the United States still remains a highly contested issue and has developed into one of the most divisive topics within modern legal discourse. By deconstructing the political underpinnings and legal rationale of the right to an abortion through a systematic case law analysis, I will demonstrate that this right has been incrementally destabilized. This instability embedded in abortion jurisprudence has been primarily produced by a combination of textual ambiguity in the case law and judicial ambivalence regarding this complex area of law. In addition, I argue that the use of the largely discredited substantive due process doctrine to ground this contentious right has also contributed to the lack of legal stability. I assert that when these elements culminate in the realm of reproductive privacy the right to terminate a pregnancy becomes increasingly unstable and contested.