Inflation Targeting and Output Growth: Evidence from Aggregate European Data

This paper evaluates inflation targeting and assesses its merits by comparing alternative targets in a macroeconomic model. We use European aggregate data to evaluate the performance of alternative policy rules under alternative inflation targets in terms of output losses. We employ two major alternative policy rules, forward-looking and spontaneous adjustment, and three alternative inflation targets, zero percent, two percent, and four percent inflation rates. The simulation findings suggest that forward-looking rules contributed to macroeconomic stability and increase monetary policy credibility. The superiority of a positive inflation target, in terms of output losses, emerges for the aggregate data. The same methodology, when applied to individual countries, however, suggests that country-specific flexible inflation targeting can improve employment prospects in Europe.

Quantile Inferences for Inflation and Its Variability: Does a Threshold Inflation Rate Exist?

Using quantile regressions and cross-sectional data from 152 countries, we examine the relationship between inflation and its variability. We consider two measures of inflation - the mean and median - and three different measures of inflation variability - the standard deviation, coefficient of variation, and median deviation. Using the mean and standard deviation or the median and the median deviation, the results support both the hypothesis that higher inflation creates more inflation variability and that inflation variability raises inflation across quantiles. Moreover, higher quantiles in both cases lead to larger marginal effects of inflation (inflation variability) on inflation variability (inflation). Using the mean and the coefficient of variation, however, the findings largely support no correlation between inflation and its variability. Finally, we also consider whether thresholds for inflation rate or inflation variability exist before finding such positive correlations. We find evidence of thresholds for inflation rates below 3 percent, but mixed results for thresholds for inflation variability.

Monetary Policy Delegation, Contract Costs, and Contract Targets

We reconsider the optimal central banker contract derived in Walsh (1995). We show that if the government's objective function places weight (value) on the cost of the contract, then the optimal inflation contract does not completely neutralize the inflation bias. That is, a fraction of the inflation bias emerges in the resulting inflation rate after the central banker's monetary policy decision. Furthermore, the more concerned the government is about the cost of the contract or the less selfish (more benevolent) is the central banker, the smaller is the share of the inflation bias eliminated by the contract. No matter how concerned the government is about the cost of the contract or how unselfish (benevolent) the central banker is, the contract always reduces the inflationary bias by at least half. Finally, a central banker contract written in terms of output (i.e., incorporating an output target) can completely eradicate the inflationary bias, regardless of concerns about contract costs.

Endogenous Financing and the Long Run Impact of Money Growth on Output and Prices

Most monetary models make use of the quantity theory of money along with a Phillips curve. This implies a strong correlation between money growth and output in the short run (with little or no correlation between money and prices) and a strong long run correlation between money growth and inflation and inflation (with little or no correlation between money growth and output). The empirical evidence between money and inflation is very robust, but the long run money/output relationship is ambiguous at best. This paper attempts to explain this by looking at the impact of money growth on firm financing.

Does the Federal Reserve Follow a Non-Linear Taylor Rule?

The Taylor rule has become one of the most studied strategies for monetary policy. Yet, little is known whether the Federal Reserve follows a non-linear Taylor rule. This paper employs the smooth transition regression model and asks the question: does the Federal Reserve change its policy-rule according to the level of inflation and/or the output gap? I find that the Federal Reserve does follow a non-linear Taylor rule and, more importantly, that the Federal Reserve followed a non-linear Taylor rule during the golden era of monetary policy, 1985-2005, and a linear Taylor rule throughout the dark age of monetary policy, 1960-1979. Thus, good monetary policy is associated with a non-linear Taylor rule: once inflation approaches a certain threshold, the Federal Reserve adjusts its policy-rule and begins to respond more forcefully to inflation.

Financial Liberalization and Inflationary Dynamics in the Context of a Small Open Economy

The paper develops a short-run model of a small open financially repressed economy characterized by unorganized money markets, capital good imports, capital mobility, wage indexation, and flexible exchange rates. The analysis shows that financial liberalization, in the form of an increased rate of interest on deposits and tight monetary policy, unambiguously and unconditionally causes deflation. Moreover, the results do not depend on the degree of capital mobility and structure of wage setting. The paper recommends that a small open developing economy should deregulate interest rates and tighten monetary policy if reducing inflation is a priority. The pre-requisite for such a policy, however, requires the establishment of a flexible exchange rate regime.

Expectations, and Credibility in a Model of Monetary Policy

Recent monetary history has been characterized by monetary authorities which have been, alternatively hard and soft on inflation. In a vintage capital framework, investment decisions are not easily reversed. Therefore, expectations of policy as well as current policy are important to the investment decision. Here, a vintage capital model is used to assess the value of central bank credibility for a policy change. Policy in this model is assumed to be private information of the central banker. Agents learn about that policy which to study the ensuing transitional dynamics following a change in monetary policy regime.

Optimal Central Banker Contracts and Common Agency

This paper considers the contacting approach to central banking in the context of a simple common agency model. The recent literature on optimal contracts suggests that the political principal of the central bank can design the appropriate incentive schemes that remedy for time-inconsistency problems in monetary policy. The effectiveness of such contracts, however, requires a central banker that attaches a positive weight to the incentive scheme. As a result, delegating monetary policy under such circumstances gives rise to the possibility that the central banker may respond to incentive schemes offered by other potential principals. We introduce common agency considerations in the design of optimal central banker contracts. We introduce two principals - society (government) and an interest group, whose objectives conflict with society's and we examine under what circumstances the government-offered or the interest-group-offered contract dominates. Our results largely depend on the type of bias that the interest group contract incorporates. In particular, when the interest group contract incorporates an inflationary bias the outcome depends on the principals' relative concern of the incentive schemes' costs. When the interest group contract incorporates an expansionary bias, however, it always dominates the government contract. A corollary of our results is that central banker contracts aiming to remove the expansionary bias of policymakers should be written explicitly in terms of the perceived bias.

International Money and Finance

We discuss the effectiveness of pegged exchange rate regimes from an historical perspective, drawing conclusions for their effectiveness today. Starting with the classical gold standard period, we point out that a succession of pegged regimes have ended in failure; except for the first, which was ended by the outbreak of World War I, all of the others we discuss have been ended by adverse economic developments for which the regimes themselves were partly responsible. Prior to World War II the main problem was a shortage of monetary gold that we argue is implicated as a cause of the Great Depression. After World War II, more particularly from the late-1960s, the main problem has been a surfeit of the main international reserve asset, the US dollar. This has led to generalized inflation in the 1970s and into the 1980s. Today, excessive dollar international base money creation is again a problem that could have serious consequences for world economic stability.