Improving Health Literacy in Connecticut: A Prescription for Healthy Lives and Communities

The Practicum Project is a supervised service-learning experience that integrates curriculum with hands-on experience in a public health setting. All 2nd year students are expected to work collaboratively in assessing the extent, causes and public health responses to a selected public health problem confronting citizens of Connecticut. The focal topic for the 2006 Project was Health Literacy in Connecticut. During this past spring, 17 students of our program, working alongside and in partnership with more than 75 community-based stakeholders across Connecticut, completed over 1800 hours of service-learning in pursuit of answers to 3 questions: Can the present and future burden of health literacy be estimated for Connecticut? What is the current capacity of Connecticut’s health and social service system to halt the crisis we confront today? Can new policy and regulatory strategies be put forth to reduce the severity and scope of the problem? This occasion and the accompanying report mark the completion of their project and acknowledge the considerable contributions that many have made to the success of this educational experience. Through those combined efforts, students gained experience and skill addressing one of the most significant public health issues of our time; also, they gained insight into the breadth and capacity of our public health system and established invaluable relationships with public health practitioners, agencies and institutions around the state. Their report documents a rich campus-community partnership to advance public health goals.

The Making of Optimal and Consistent Policy: An Analytical Framework for Monetary Models

This paper shows that optimal policy and consistent policy outcomes require the use of control-theory and game-theory solution techniques. While optimal policy and consistent policy often produce different outcomes even in a one-period model, we analyze consistent policy and its outcome in a simple model, finding that the cause of the inconsistency with optimal policy traces to inconsistent targets in the social loss function. As a result, the central bank should adopt a loss function that differs from the social loss function. Carefully designing the central bank s loss function with consistent targets can harmonize optimal and consistent policy. This desirable result emerges from two observations. First, the social loss function reflects a normative process that does not necessarily prove consistent with the structure of the microeconomy. Thus, the social loss function cannot serve as a direct loss function for the central bank. Second, an optimal loss function for the central bank must depend on the structure of that microeconomy. In addition, this paper shows that control theory provides a benchmark for institution design in a game-theoretical framework.

The Making of Optimal and Consistent Policy: An Implementation Theory Framework for Monetary Policy

This paper shows that optimal policy and consistent policy outcomes require the use of control-theory and game-theory solution techniques. While optimal policy and consistent policy often produce different outcomes even in a one-period model, we analyze consistent policy and its outcome in a simple model, finding that the cause of the inconsistency with optimal policy traces to inconsistent targets in the social loss function. As a result, the social loss function cannot serve as a direct loss function for the central bank. Accordingly, we employ implementation theory to design a central bank loss function (mechanism design) with consistent targets, while the social loss function serves as a social welfare criterion. That is, with the correct mechanism design for the central bank loss function, optimal policy and consistent policy become identical. In other words, optimal policy proves implementable (consistent).