Visualizing the Simulation of 3-D Underwater Sensor Networks

The majority of sensor network research deals with land-based networks, which are essentially two-dimensional, and thus the majority of simulation and animation tools also only handle such networks. Underwater sensor networks on the other hand, are essentially 3D networks because the depth at which a sensor node is located needs to be considered as well. Due to that additional dimension, specialized tools need to be used when conducting simulations for experimentation. The School of Engineering’s Underwater Sensor Network (UWSN) lab is conducting research on underwater sensor networks and requires simulation tools for 3D networks. The lab has extended NS-2, a widely used network simulator, so that it can simulate three-dimensional networks. However, NAM, a widely used network animator, currently only supports two-dimensional networks and no extensions have been implemented to give it three-dimensional capabilities. In this project, we develop a network visualization tool that functions similarly to NAM but is able to render network environments in full 3-D. It is able to take as input a NS-2 trace file (the same file taken as input by NAM), create the environment, position the sensor nodes, and animate the events of the simulation. Further, the visualization tool is easy to use, especially friendly to NAM users, as it is designed to follow the interfaces and functions similar to NAM. So far, the development has fulfilled the basic functionality. Future work includes fully functional capabilities for visualization and much improved user interfaces.

Do Exposure Suits Produce a 'Race to File'? An Economic Analysis of a Tort for Risk

Conventional tort law does not allow victims of exposure to a toxic substance to seek compensation until they develop actual symptoms of illness. This may effectively bar recovery because at the time the illness arises, injurers may be judgment proof. One possible response is to allow a tort for risk that allows victims to seek expected damages at the time of exposure. However, critics charge that this could create a 'race to file' wherein victims rush to file suit to ensure that they will get a share of the injurer's limited assets. We show that such a race may or may not occur in equilibrium, and that when it does occur, not all victims choose to file at exposure if bankruptcy is an inevitable result. If bankruptcy is not inevitable, it is possible that a tort for risk will trigger bankruptcy, although a no-bankruptcy equilibrium always exists and Paretodominates the bankruptcy equilibrium. We examine the consequences of the various tort-for-risk equilibria on the compensation of exposure victims, litigation costs, and injurer care.