3 resultados para exceptional regimes
em University of Connecticut - USA
Resumo:
A small, but growing, body of literature searches for evidence of non-Keynesian effects of fiscal contractions. That is, some evidence exists that large fiscal contractions stimulate short-run economic activity. Our paper continues this research effort by systematically examining the effects, if any, of unusual fiscal events - either non-Keynesian results within a Keynesian model or Keynesian results within a neoclassical model -- on short-run economic activity. We examine this issue within three separate models -- a St. Louis equation, a Hall-type consumption equation, and a growth accounting equation. Our empirical findings are mixed, and do not provide strong systematic support for the view that unusually large fiscal contractions/expansions reverse the effects of normal fiscal events. Moreover, we find only limited evidence that trigger points are empirically important.
Resumo:
This paper shows that countries characterized by a financial accelerator mechanism may reverse the usual finding of the literature -- flexible exchange rate regimes do a worse job of insulating open economies from external shocks. I obtain this result with a calibrated small open economy model that endogenizes foreign interest rates by linking them to the banking sector's foreign currency leverage. This relationship renders exchange rate policy more important compared to the usual exogeneity assumption. I find empirical support for this prediction using the Local Projections method. Finally, 2nd order approximation to the model finds larger welfare losses under flexible regimes.
Resumo:
This paper examines whether the presence of informal credit markets reduces the cost of credit rationing in terms of growth. In a dynamic general equilibrium framework, we assume that firms are heterogenous with different degrees of risk and households invest in human capital development. With the help of Indian household level data we show that the informal market reduces the cost of rationing by increasing the growth rate by 0.7 percent. This higher growth rate, in the presence of an informal sector, is due to the ability of the informal market to separate the high risk from the low risk firms thanks to better information. But even after such improvement we do not get the optimum outcome. The findings, based on our second question, suggest that the revelation of firms' type, based on incentive compatible pricing, can lead to almost 2 percent higher growth rate as compared to the credit rationing regime with informal sector.