Recognizing a Single-Issue Spatial Election

A single-issue spatial election is a voter preference profile derived from an arrangement of candidates and voters on a line, with each voter preferring the nearer of each pair of candidates. We provide a polynomial-time algorithm that determines whether a given preference profile is a single-issue spatial election and, if so, constructs such an election. This result also has preference representation and mechanism design applications.

The Moderating Role of Electoral Pressure on Congressional Ideological Polarization: A Cross-Sectional Time-Series Analysis

Reelection and self-interest are recurring themes in the study of our congressional leaders. To date, many studies have already been done on the trends between elections, party affiliation, and voting behavior in Congress. However, because a plethora of data has been collected on both elections and congressional voting, the ability to draw a connection between the two provides a very reasonable prospect. This project analyzes whether voting shifts in congressional elections have an effect on congressional voting. Will a congressman become ideologically more polarized when his electoral margins increase? Essentially, this paper assumes that all congressmen are ideologically polarized, and it is elections which serve to reel congressmen back toward the ideological middle. The election and ideological data for this study, which spans from the 56th to the 107th Congress, finds statistically significant relationships between these two variables. In fact, congressman pay attention to election returns when voting in Congress. When broken down by party, Democrats are more exhibitive of this phenomenon, which suggest that Democrats may be more likely to intrinsically follow the popular model of representation. Meanwhile, it can be hypothesized that insignificant results for Republicans indicate that Republicans may follow a trustee model of representation.

An Appropriate Role for the Leadership: A Quantitative Analysis of the Effects of House Leadership on Open-Seat Races

This paper investigates the effects on open-seat races in the United States House of Representatives. This project focuses on the influence that the House leadership exerts on races. Generally, the leadership influences race through spending by party organizations and leadership visits. During each election cycle, national party organizations spend millions of dollars to get their candidates into office. I have developed a multiple regression model that measures different types of spending from the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee, the National Republican Congressional Committee, and the Republican National Committee and the effects of these spending types on the election results. Also, the study examines the number of visits by each party’s leadership to each race. I introduced control variables that account for the year, the competitiveness of each race, and the individual candidate fundraising. In terms of statistical significance, the results were mixed showing one type of party spending to be highly influential in the outcome of the race. Competitiveness and individual candidate fundraising also achieved statistical significance. The study also includes a qualitative investigation of leadership visits and individual case studies in order to understand better the way in which the data interact in real campaigns.