9 resultados para dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models
em University of Connecticut - USA
Resumo:
In this paper we introduce technical efficiency via the intercept that evolve over time as a AR(1) process in a stochastic frontier (SF) framework in a panel data framework. Following are the distinguishing features of the model. First, the model is dynamic in nature. Second, it can separate technical inefficiency from fixed firm-specific effects which are not part of inefficiency. Third, the model allows one to estimate technical change separate from change in technical efficiency. We propose the ML method to estimate the parameters of the model. Finally, we derive expressions to calculate/predict technical inefficiency (efficiency).
Resumo:
Based on an order-theoretic approach, we derive sufficient conditions for the existence, characterization, and computation of Markovian equilibrium decision processes and stationary Markov equilibrium on minimal state spaces for a large class of stochastic overlapping generations models. In contrast to all previous work, we consider reduced-form stochastic production technologies that allow for a broad set of equilibrium distortions such as public policy distortions, social security, monetary equilibrium, and production nonconvexities. Our order-based methods are constructive, and we provide monotone iterative algorithms for computing extremal stationary Markov equilibrium decision processes and equilibrium invariant distributions, while avoiding many of the problems associated with the existence of indeterminacies that have been well-documented in previous work. We provide important results for existence of Markov equilibria for the case where capital income is not increasing in the aggregate stock. Finally, we conclude with examples common in macroeconomics such as models with fiat money and social security. We also show how some of our results extend to settings with unbounded state spaces.
Resumo:
Credit markets with asymmetric information often prefer credit rationing as a profit maximizing device. This paper asks whether the presence of informal credit markets reduces the cost of credit rationing, that is, whether it can alleviate the impact of asymmetric information based on the available information. We used a dynamic general equilibrium model with heterogenous agents to assess this. Using Indian credit market data our study shows that the presence of informal credit market can reduce the cost of credit rationing by separating high risk firms from the low risk firms in the informal market. But even after this improvement, the steady state capital accumulation is still much lower as compared to incentive based market clearing rates. Through self revelation of each firm's type, based on the incentive mechanism, banks can diversify their risk by achieving a separating equilibrium in the loan market. The incentive mechanism helps banks to increase capital accumulation in the long run by charging lower rates and lending relatively higher amount to the less risky firms. Another important finding of this study is that self-revelation leads to very significant welfare improvement, as measured by consumptiuon equivalence.
Resumo:
This paper examines whether the presence of informal credit markets reduces the cost of credit rationing in terms of growth. In a dynamic general equilibrium framework, we assume that firms are heterogenous with different degrees of risk and households invest in human capital development. With the help of Indian household level data we show that the informal market reduces the cost of rationing by increasing the growth rate by 0.7 percent. This higher growth rate, in the presence of an informal sector, is due to the ability of the informal market to separate the high risk from the low risk firms thanks to better information. But even after such improvement we do not get the optimum outcome. The findings, based on our second question, suggest that the revelation of firms' type, based on incentive compatible pricing, can lead to almost 2 percent higher growth rate as compared to the credit rationing regime with informal sector.
Resumo:
The consensus view is that central banks under currency boards do not have tools for active monetary policy. In this paper, we analyze the foreign exchange fee as a monetary policy instrument that can be used by a central bank under a currency board. We develop a general equilibrium model showing that changes in this fee may have the same effects as a change in the monetary policy stance. Thus central banks under the currency board are shown to have an avenue to implement active monetary policy.
Resumo:
Credit-rationing model similar to Stiglitz and Weiss [1981] is combined with the information externality model of Lang and Nakamura [1993] to examine the properties of mortgage markets characterized by both adverse selection and information externalities. In a credit-rationing model, additional information increases lenders ability to distinguish risks, which leads to increased supply of credit. According to Lang and Nakamura, larger supply of credit leads to additional market activities and therefore, greater information. The combination of these two propositions leads to a general equilibrium model. This paper describes properties of this general equilibrium model. The paper provides another sufficient condition in which credit rationing falls with information. In that, external information improves the accuracy of equity-risk assessments of properties, which reduces credit rationing. Contrary to intuition, this increased accuracy raises the mortgage interest rate. This allows clarifying the trade offs associated with reduced credit rationing and the quality of applicant pool.
Resumo:
This paper provides new sufficient conditions for the existence, computation via successive approximations, and stability of Markovian equilibrium decision processes for a large class of OLG models with stochastic nonclassical production. Our notion of stability is existence of stationary Markovian equilibrium. With a nonclassical production, our economies encompass a large class of OLG models with public policy, valued fiat money, production externalities, and Markov shocks to production. Our approach combines aspects of both topological and order theoretic fixed point theory, and provides the basis of globally stable numerical iteration procedures for computing extremal Markovian equilibrium objects. In addition to new theoretical results on existence and computation, we provide some monotone comparative statics results on the space of economies.
Resumo:
The study investigates the role of credit risk in a continuous time stochastic asset allocation model, since the traditional dynamic framework does not provide credit risk flexibility. The general model of the study extends the traditional dynamic efficiency framework by explicitly deriving the optimal value function for the infinite horizon stochastic control problem via a weighted volatility measure of market and credit risk. The model's optimal strategy was then compared to that obtained from a benchmark Markowitz-type dynamic optimization framework to determine which specification adequately reflects the optimal terminal investment returns and strategy under credit and market risks. The paper shows that an investor's optimal terminal return is lower than typically indicated under the traditional mean-variance framework during periods of elevated credit risk. Hence I conclude that, while the traditional dynamic mean-variance approach may indicate the ideal, in the presence of credit-risk it does not accurately reflect the observed optimal returns, terminal wealth and portfolio selection strategies.
Resumo:
This paper provides sufficient conditions for existence of Markovian equilibrium in models with non-paternalistic altruism extending to one generation ahead. When utility is non-separable, we show that each equilibrium savings policy correspondence is increasing everywhere and single-valued, except perhaps on a countable number of points. It is also upper hemi-continuous where it is single valued. When utility is separable, we show that the equilibrium is unique, increasing, and continuous, and we provide an algorithm converging uniformly to the equilibrium.