An Equilibrium Model of Lawmaking

This paper embeds a model of lawmaking in an equilibrium framework in which the demand for trials is rationed by court delay. The lawmaking process depends on a combination of selective litigation, judicial bias, and precedent. The steady state equilibrium of the model determines both the length of delay and the distribution of legal rules. Comparative statics show that an increase in the supply of trials reduces delay but may or may not increase the proportion of efficient rules. An increase in the fraction of judges biased in favor of the efficient rule, however, will likely improve efficiency on both counts.

Family Court Judges' Training, Background, and Child Development Knowledge: Associations with Child Custody Decision Making

Family court judges are often asked to make inferences about - or directly interview children to ascertain - children's custody preferences and their maturity to express such preferences. These estimates of children's developmental maturity are important to the judges' considerations of children's "best interests" in custody cases. The research literature describing family court judges' background, education, training, and knowledge about child development is scant. With appropriate child development knowledge, judges should be better able to identify the developmental stages at which children have the cognitive and social capabilities to communicate directly their placement wishes or concerns. The current study is the first to examine judges' estimates of - and actual tests of - their child development knowledge, their training/education, and their application of this knowledge to their decisions to involve children as participants in contested custody cases.