Monetary Policy Delegation, Contract Costs, and Contract Targets

We reconsider the optimal central banker contract derived in Walsh (1995). We show that if the government's objective function places weight (value) on the cost of the contract, then the optimal inflation contract does not completely neutralize the inflation bias. That is, a fraction of the inflation bias emerges in the resulting inflation rate after the central banker's monetary policy decision. Furthermore, the more concerned the government is about the cost of the contract or the less selfish (more benevolent) is the central banker, the smaller is the share of the inflation bias eliminated by the contract. No matter how concerned the government is about the cost of the contract or how unselfish (benevolent) the central banker is, the contract always reduces the inflationary bias by at least half. Finally, a central banker contract written in terms of output (i.e., incorporating an output target) can completely eradicate the inflationary bias, regardless of concerns about contract costs.

Transaction Costs, Production Costs, and the Passage of Time

No abstract available.

Risk, Transaction Costs, and Tax Assignment: Government Finance in the Ottoman Empire

Risk and transaction costs often provide competing explanations of institutional outcomes. In this paper we argue that they offer opposing predictions regarding the assignment of fixed and variable taxes in a multi-tiered governmental structure. While the central government can pool regional risks from variable taxes, local governments can measure variable tax bases more accurately. Evidence on tax assignment from the mid-sixteenth century Ottoman Empire supports the transaction cost explanation, suggesting that risk matters less because insurance can be obtained in a variety of ways.

Policy Advice during a Crisis

Good policy making is an art. It involves a substantial element of personal judgement about risks and consequences of alternative courses of actions and decisions. It is also a science because it requires systematic gathering and analysis of evidence about a policy issue, and rational assessment of costs and benefits of various ways of addressing the issue. However, in a crisis, there is little time to gather evidence or to search for imaginative solutions to a problem. There is a tendency, in such a situation, to act under pressure rather than on the basis of evidence, analysis or informed judgement. Furthermore, a crisis often creates a situation in which policy makers receive all sorts of advice. This note discusses a set of concepts, originating mainly from economics, that can be used to assess soundness of policy and advice, particularly during a crisis. These are concepts of rationality, sustainability, inclusiveness, feasibility, practicality and tipping, which can be used in decision making in normal and crisis times to reduce risks of disastrous advice or policy.