Legal Change: Integrating Selective Litigation, Judicial Preferences, and Precedent

The claim that the common law displays an economic logic is a centerpiece of the positive economic theory of law. A key question in this literature is whether this outcome is due to the conscious efforts of judges, or the result of invisible hand processes. This paper develops a model in which to two effects combine to determine the direction of legal change. The main conclusions are, first, that judicial bias can prevent the law from evolving toward efficiency if the fraction of judges biased against the efficient rule is large enough; and second, that precedent affects the rate of legal change but not its direction.

France, Italy, and Spain: Culturally Similar Nations, Yet Drastically Different In Their Roles as European Union Nations

Since France, Italy and Spain are neighboring Western European countries, whose languages and cultures have descended from Latin, it is inevitable that these countries share similarities on many levels. France, Italy and Spain share similar lifestyles, religious values and cultural heritages. Throughout history France, Italy and Spain have experienced many of the same historical events because of their geographical proximity. Now that all three countries are members of the European Union they have become further united by occupying a common area without border controls, and sharing a common market, laws, and currency. While France, Italy and Spain share many commonalities, their opinions and relationships within the European Union are diverse. Although each nation struggles to balance its national identity with its European identity and to maintain its sovereignty while at the same time giving some of it up to the EU, each nation has its own ideas about how much its identity should change and how much sovereignty it should give up to the EU government. Each nation also has unique opinions about what it means to part of the European Union and what the requirements for becoming a member nation should be. Each nation has different goals it hopes to accomplish for its own country and for the European Union. The differing ideas amongst France, Italy and Spain are a result of the variance that exists amongst their political and economic relationships and institutions, which have been molded by the historical experiences of each nation. The focus of this paper will be examining why France, Spain and Italy share many cultural similarities, yet differ so greatly in their roles as members of the European Union. After a brief background on the European Union, I will discuss the cultural similarities France, Italy and Spain share. I will then mention several economic and political differences between the three countries and use supporting evidence to explain why and in what context these differences have arisen

Property Law

This chapter examines the economics of property rights and property law. Property law is a fundamental part of social organization and is also fundamental to the operation of the economy because it defines and protects the bundle of rights that constitute property. Property law thereby creates incentives to protect and invest in assets and establishes a legal framework within which market exchange of assets can take place. The purpose of this chapter is to show how the economics of property rights can be used to understand fundamental features of property law and related extra-legal institutions. The chapter will both examine the rationale for legal doctrine and the effects of legal doctrine regarding the exercise, enforcement, and transfer of rights. It will also examine various property rights regimes including open access, private ownership, common property and state property. The guiding questions are: How are property rights established? What explains the variation in the types of property rights? What governs the use and transfer of rights? And, how are property rights enforced?