Religious Identity and Consumption

Consumption choices assist in solving the problem of how to convey and recognize religious identities. In the communication of an identity, individuals use the knowledge embedded in consumption norms, which restrict the range of choices to a smaller set and abbreviate the required knowledge for encoding and decoding messages. Using this knowledge as a shared framework for understanding, individuals with religious beliefs can choose consumption items that would not only strengthen their beliefs but also help them express the intensity of their commitments to these beliefs. Because individuals and societies have different beliefs, norms, commitments, and expressive needs, consumption choice can help to express these differences. Our explanation contrasts with incentive-based approaches that view religious consumption norms as solutions to free-rider problem inherent in clubs.

A Median Voter Theorem for Postelection Politics

We analyze a model of 'postelection politics', in which (unlike in the more common Downsian models of 'preelection politics') politicians cannot make binding commitments prior to elections. The game begins with an incumbent politician in office, and voters adopt reelection strategies that are contingent on the policies implemented by the incumbent. We generalize previous models of this type by introducing heterogeneity in voters' ideological preferences, and analyze how voters' reelection strategies constrain the policies chosen by a rent-maximizing incumbent. We first show that virtually any policy (and any feasible level of rent for the incumbent) can be sustained in a Nash equilibrium. Then, we derive a 'median voter theorem': the ideal point of the median voter, and the minimum feasible level of rent, are the unique outcomes in any strong Nash equilibrium. We then introduce alternative refinements that are less restrictive. In particular, Ideologically Loyal Coalition-proof equilibrium also leads uniquely to the median outcome.