Covert or Overt Intervention? The Reagan Administration in Latin America

In my thesis I looked at Cold War interventionism by America. In the Post WWII period, many countries were searching for freedom from colonial rule, and many were attracted to the idea of communism or socialism. In this context of a destabilized world and power struggle between the U.S.A and the U.S.S.R., revolutions often became points of interests and parts of this larger power play. Any type of revolution was a destabilization, in a system that was unstable at best, and peace between the powers rested precariously on the idea of “Mutually Assured Destruction.” I would like to look more specifically, at the Latin American Region, which seemed full of upheaval, and was an area of much intervention, especially during the Reagan Administration. This administration had varying goals and conflicts about the region. The large amount of interventionism in the 1980s was in part a response to the Vietnam War, which was seen as an American failure, since prevention of communism did not occur. Following this, American strength needed to be shown again in the international stage, especially in Latin America, due to its close proximity to America. I would like to explore the intervention in Grenada and see if it followed a pattern of intervention in the region. This will be contrasted with the case of Nicaragua, which seemed more typical of interventions in the region. The causes of intervention in the region as well as the reasons these interventions took such different courses will be explored and investigated.

Representing Afghanistan: The United States and Democracy's Imposition

There is an ongoing mission in Afghanistan; a mission driven by external political forces. At its core this mission hopes to establish peace, to protect the populace, and to install democracy. Each of these goals has remained just that, a goal, for the past eight years as the American and international mission in Afghanistan has enjoyed varied levels of commitment. Currently, the stagnant progress in Afghanistan has led the international community to become increasingly concerned about the viability of a future Afghan state. Most of these questions take root in the question over whether or not an Afghan state can function without the auspices of international terrorism. Inevitably, the normative question of what exactly that government should be arises from this base concern. In formulating a response to this question, the consensus of western society has been to install representative democracy. This answer has been a recurring theme in the post Cold War era as states such as Bosnia and Somalia bear witness to the ill effects of external democratic imposition. I hypothesize that the current mold of externally driven state-building is unlikely to result in what western actors seek it to establish: representative democracy. By primarily examining the current situation in Afghanistan, I claim that external installation of representative democracy is modally flawed in that its process mandates choice. Representative democracy by definition constitutes a government reflective of its people, or electorate. Thus, freedom of choice is necessary for a functional representative democracy. From this, one can deduce that because an essential function of democracy is choice, its implementation lies with the presence of choice. State-building is an imposition that eliminates that necessary ingredient. The two stand as polar opposites that cannot effectively collaborate. Security, governing capacity, and development have all been targeted as measurements of success in Afghanistan. The three factors are generally seen as mutually constitutive; so improved security is seen as improving governing capacity. Thus, the recent resurgence of the Taliban in Afghanistan and a deteriorating security environment moving forward has demonstrated the inability of the Afghan government to govern. The primary reason for the Afghan government’s deficiencies is its lack of legitimacy among its constituency. Even the use of the term ‘constituency’ must be qualified because the Afghan government has often oscillated between serving the people within its territorial borders and the international community. The existence of the Afghan state is so dependent on foreign aid and intervention that it has lost policy-making and enforcing power. This is evident by the inability of Afghanistan to engage in basic sovereign state activities as maintaining a national budget, conducting elections, providing for its own national security, and deterring criminality. The Afghan state is nothing more than a shell of a government, and indicative of the failings that external state-building has with establishing democracy.