Equilibria with Local Governments and Commuting: Income Sorting vs. Income Mixing

Tiebout's (1956) model of fiscal competition suggests income sorting between jurisdictions while the Alonso (1964), Mills (167) and Muth (1969) model of the monocentric city suggests income sorting over space. However, strict income sorting is not empirically observed. We add fiscal competition to the spatial model by considering a circular inner city surrounded by a suburb. The fiscal difference between the jurisdictions and the commuting advantage of locations closer to the city center are capitalized into house prices. In addition to the traditional equilibrium with income sorting, there are equilibria with income mixing - both across jurisdictions and across space.

Who's in Charge in the Inner City? The Conflict Between Efficiency and Equity in the Design of a Metropolitan Area

A circular metropolitan area consists of an inner city and a suburb. Households sort over the two jurisdictions based on public service levels and their costs of commuting to the metropolitan center. Using numerical simulations, we show (1) there typically exist two equilibria: one in which the poor form the majority in the inner city and the other in which the rich form the majority in the inner city; (2) there is an efficiency vs. equity trade-off as to which equilibrium is preferred; and (3) if the inner city contains only poor households, equity favors expanding the inner city to include rich households.