Beyond Racial Precedents: Loving v. Virginia as an Appropriate Legal Model and Strategy for Same-Sex Marriage Litigation

This thesis explores how LGBT marriage activists and lawyers have employed a racial interpretation of due process and equal protection in recent same-sex marriage litigation. Special attention is paid to the Supreme Court's opinion in Loving v. Virginia, the landmark case that declared anti-miscegenation laws unconstitutional. By exploring the use of racial precedent in same-sex marriage litigation and its treatment in state court cases, this thesis critiques the racial interpretation of due process and equal protection that became the basis for LGBT marriage briefs and litigation, and attempts to answer the question of whether a racial interpretation of due process and equal protection is an appropriate model for same-sex marriage litigation both constitutionally and strategically. The existing scholarly literature fails to explore how this issue has been treated in case briefs, which are very important elements in any legal proceeding. I will argue that through an analysis of recent state court briefs in Massachusetts and Connecticut, Loving acts as logical precedent for the legalization of same-sex marriage. I also find, more significantly, that although this racial interpretation of due process and equal protection represented by Loving can be seen as an appropriate model for same-sex marriage litigation constitutionally, questions remain about its strategic effectiveness, as LGBT lawyers have moved away from race in some arguments in these briefs. Indeed, a racial interpretation of Due Process and Equal Protection doctrine imposes certain limits on same-sex marriage litigation, of which we are warned by some Critical Race theorists, Latino Critical Legal theorists, and other scholars. In order to fully incorporate a discussion of race into the argument for legalizing same-sex marriage, the dangers posed by the black/white binary of race relations must first be overcome.

Now You See it, Now You Don't: Why Do Real Estate Agents Withhold Available Houses from Black Customers?

Potential home buyers may initiate contact with a real estate agent by asking to see a particular advertised house. This paper asks whether an agent's response to such a request depends on the race of the potential buyer or on whether the house is located in an integrated neighborhood. We build on previous research about the causes of discrimination in housing by using data from fair housing audits, a matched-pair technique for comparing the treatment of equllay qualified black and white home buyers. However, we shift the focus from differences in the treatment of paired buyers to agent decisions concerning an individual housing unit using a sample of all houses seen during he 1989 Housing Discrimination study. We estimate a random effect, multinomial logit model to explain a real estate agent's joint decisions concerning whether to show each unit to a black auditor and to a white auditor. We find evidence that agents withhold houses in suburban, integrated neighborhoods from all customers (redlining), that agents' decisions to show houses in integrated neighborhoods are not the same for black and white customers (steering), and that the houses agents show are more likely to deviate from the initial request when the customeris black than when the customer is white. These deviations are consistent with the possibility that agents act upon the belief that some types of transactions are relatively unlikely for black customers (statistical discrimination).

Macroeconomic Rationality and Lucas' Misperceptions Model: Further Evidence from Forty-One Countries

Several researchers have examined Lucas's misperceptions model as well as various propositions derived from it within a cross-section empirical framework. The cross-section approach imposes a single monetary policy regime for the entire period. Our paper innovates on existing tests of those rational expectations propositions by allowing the simultaneous effect of monetary and short run aggregate supply (oil price) shocks on output behavior and the employment of advanced panel econometric techniques. Our empirical findings, for a sample of 41 countries over 1949 to 1999, provide evidence in favor of the majority of rational expectations propositions.