Bayesian models for the analysis of genetic structure when populations are correlated

Motivation: Population allele frequencies are correlated when populations have a shared history or when they exchange genes. Unfortunately, most models for allele frequency and inference about population structure ignore this correlation. Recent analytical results show that among populations, correlations can be very high, which could affect estimates of population genetic structure. In this study, we propose a mixture beta model to characterize the allele frequency distribution among populations. This formulation incorporates the correlation among populations as well as extending the model to data with different clusters of populations. Results: Using simulated data, we show that in general, the mixture model provides a good approximation of the among-population allele frequency distribution and a good estimate of correlation among populations. Results from fitting the mixture model to a dataset of genotypes at 377 autosomal microsatellite loci from human populations indicate high correlation among populations, which may not be appropriate to neglect. Traditional measures of population structure tend to over-estimate the amount of genetic differentiation when correlation is neglected. Inference is performed in a Bayesian framework.

Search, Seizure and (False?) Arrest: An Analysis of Fourth Amendment Remedies when Police can Plant Evidence

The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures in criminal investigations. The Supreme Court has interpreted this to require that police obtain a warrant prior to search and that illegally seized evidence be excluded from trial. A consensus has developed in the law and economics literature that tort liability for police officers is a superior means of deterring unreasonable searches. We argue that this conclusion depends on the assumption of truth-seeking police, and develop a game-theoretic model to compare the two remedies when some police officers (the bad type) are willing to plant evidence in order to obtain convictions, even though other police (the good type) are not (where this type is private information). We characterize the perfect Bayesian equilibria of the asymmetric-information game between the police and a court that seeks to minimize error costs in deciding whether to convict or acquit suspects. In this framework, we show that the exclusionary rule with a warrant requirement leads to superior outcomes (relative to tort liability) in terms of truth-finding function of courts, because the warrant requirement can reduce the scope for bad types of police to plant evidence