Geographic Deregulation and Commercial Bank Performance in US State Banking Markets

This paper examines the effects of geographical deregulation on commercial bank performance across states. We reach some general conclusions. First, the process of deregulation on an intrastate and interstate basis generally improves bank profitability and performance. Second, the macroeconomic variables -- the unemployment rate and real personal income per capita -- and the average interest rate affect bank performance as much, or more, than the process of deregulation. Finally, while deregulation toward full interstate banking and branching may produce more efficient banks and a healthier banking system, we find mixed results on this issue.

Bank Performance: Market Power or Efficient Structure?

Regulatory change not seen since the Great Depression swept the U.S. banking industry beginning in the early 1980s, culminating with the Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994. Significant consolidations have occurred in the banking industry. This paper considers the market-power versus the efficient-structure theories of the positive correlation between banking concentration and performance on a state-by-state basis. Temporal causality tests imply that bank concentration leads bank profitability, supporting the market-power, rather than the efficient-structure, theory of that positive correlation. Our finding suggests that bank regulators, by focusing on local banking markets, missed the initial stages of an important structural change at the state level.

Foreign and Domestic Bank Performances: An Ideal Decomposition of Industry Dynamics

The aggregate performance of the banking industry depends on the underlying microlevel dynamics within that industry. adjustments within banks, reallocations between banks, entries of new banks, and exits of existing banks. This paper develops a generalized ideal dynamic decomposition and applies it to the return on equity of foreign and domestic commercial banks in Korea from 1994 to 2000. The sample corresponds to the Asian financial crisis and the final stages of a long process of deregulation and privatization in the Korean banking industry. The comparison of our findings reveals that the overall performance of Korean banks largely reflects individual bank efficiencies, except immediately after the Asian financial crisis where restructuring played a more important role on average bank performance. Moreover, Korean regional banks started the restructuring process about one year before the Korean nationwide banks. Foreign bank performance, however, largely reflected individual bank efficiencies, even immediately after the Asian financial crisis.

The Performance of Domestic and Foreign Banks: The Case of Korea and the Asian Financial Crisis

This paper considers the performance of banks, domestic and foreign, in Korea prior to, during, and immediately after the Asian financial crisis, examining how the profitability of those banks differed and identifying factors that explain why those differences existed. The performance of Korean banks deteriorated dramatically in 1998 with most banks recovering somewhat in 1999. Foreign banks did not experience the same negative effect on their returns on assets and equity as a rule. Several standard findings emerge. For example, equity to assets correlates positively with domestic, but not foreign, bank performance, as measured by the returns on assets and equity, even when the government recapitalized institutions that were performing quite badly. Also, foreign-currency deposits significantly and negatively correlate with domestic Korean bank performance, although only in the post-crisis period for regional banks. In sum, the domestic Korean banks suffered more severely from the Asian financial crisis than foreign banks.

The Effect of the Asian Financial Crisis on the Performance of Korean Nationwide Banks

The Asian financial crisis spread its effect quickly across a number of countries. Korea faced serious problems in her financial and corporate sectors. This paper considers the performance of Korean nationwide banks before, during, and immediately after the Asian financial crisis. The performance of Korean nationwide banks took a big hit in 1998. Most banks recovered somewhat in 1999 with the notable exception of the further deterioration of Seoul. Several factors possess strong correlations with bank performance. Among other standard findings, equity to assets correlates positively with bank performance, even when the government recapitalized a number of institutions that performed poorly. The Asian crisis did not affect the normal rules of good bank management. The government, however, directly intervened in the banking sector on a large scale to limit the scope of the crisis in the Korean economy.

Explaining Recent Connecticut Bank Failures

Significant numbers of U.S. commercial bank failures in the late 1980s and early 1990s raise important questions about bank performance. We develop a failure-prediction model for Connecticut banks to examine events in 1991 and 1992. We adopt data envelopment analysis to derive measures of managerial efficiency. Our findings can be briefly stated. Managerial inefficiency does not provide significant information to explain Connecticut bank failures. Portfolio variables do generally contain significant information.

Has Deregulation Affected Births, Deaths, and Marriages in the U.S. Commercial Banking Industry?

Regulatory change not seen since the Great Depression swept the U.S. banking industry beginning in the early 1980s and culminating with the Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994. Banking analysts anticipated dramatic consolidation with large numbers of mergers and acquisitions. Less well documented, but equally important, was the continuing entry of new banks, tempering the decline in the overall number of banking institutions. This paper examines whether deregulation affected bank new-charter (birth), failure (death), and merger (marriage) rates during the 1980s and 1990s after controlling for bank performance and state economic activity. We find evidence that intrastate deregulation stimulated births and marriages, but not deaths. Moreover, we find little evidence that interstate deregulation affected births, deaths, or marriages, except that the marriage rate rose after the implementation of the Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act. Finally, pair-wise temporal causality tests among births, deaths, and marriages show that mergers temporally lead new charters and that failures lead mergers (a demonstration effect).

Has Deregulation Affected Births, Deaths, and Marriages in the U.S. Commercial Banking Industry?

Regulatory change not seen since the Great Depression swept the U.S. banking industry beginning in the early 1980s and culminating with the Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994. Banking analysts anticipated dramatic consolidation with large numbers of mergers and acquisitions. Less well documented, but equally important, was the continuing entry of new banks, tempering the decline in the overall number of banking institutions. This paper examines whether deregulation affected bank new-charter, failure, and merger rates during the 1980s and 1990s after controlling for bank performance and state economic activity. We find evidence that intrastate deregulation stimulated new charters and mergers, but not failures. Moreover, we find little evidence that interstate deregulation affected new charters, failures, or mergers.