Predicting State Allocation of Funds: The Case of John Rowland and his Hometown of Waterbury, Connecticut.

This study attempts to analyze the underlying factors and motives influencing the allocation of discretionary state expenditures. The fact that some cities receive more money than other cities begs the question of what accounts for this variation. After framing the provision of state money within the theoretical framework of political patronage, a case study of Governor Rowland’s tenure in office and the accompanying expenditures to Connecticut’s 17 largest cities from 1995 to 2004 was conducted to evaluate whether a disproportionate amount of money was given to Rowland’s hometown of Waterbury, Connecticut. Besides employing a statistical analysis that determined that cities with similar characteristics received different amounts of money, interviewing was conducted to identify reasons for such variation. The results indicate that Waterbury received a greater amount of money than was predicted based on the city’s economic and demographic characteristics, and that non-objective and biased factors such as favoritism, the need to reward political support, or the desire to increase political loyalty sometimes take precedence over more objective factors.

Schools and Housing Markets: An Examination of School Segregation and Performance in Connecticut

This paper examines the relationship between house price levels, school performance, and the racial and ethnic composition of Connecticut school districts between 1995 and 2000. A panel of Connecticut school districts over both time and labor market areas is used to estimate a simultaneous equations model describing the determinants of these variables. Specifically, school district changes in price level, school performance, and racial and ethnic compositions depend upon each other, labor market wide changes in these variables, and the deviation of each school district from the overall metropolitan area. The specification is based on the differencing of dependent variables, as opposed to the use of level or fixed effects models and lagging level variables beyond the period over which change is considered; as a result the model is robust to persistence in the sample. Identification of the simultaneous system arises from the presence of multiple labor market areas in the sample, and the assumption that labor market changes in a variable due not directly influence the allocation of households across towns within a labor market area. We find that towns in labor markets that experience an inflow of minority households have greater increases in percent minority if those towns already ahve a substantial minoritypopulation. We find evidence that this sorting proces is reflected in housing price changes in the low priced segment of the housing market, not in the middle and upper segments.

A Model of Rights

In this paper, we develop a simple model of the rights a government provides its citizenry. Rights are treated as public goods and taken as primitives in agents utility functions; each agent has preferences over the entire policy vector. We model the interaction among citi-zens and the government as a game in which an exogenous lobbying set makes contributions to the government to in uence policy formu-lation in the matter of rights. When examining contribution schedules comprising truthful Nash strategies, we find that members of the lob-bying set obtain rights closer to their most-preferred bundle, while the rights of non-lobbyers further diverge from their most-preferred bun-dle. Further, if the lobbying set comprises the entire population, the government s allocation of rights does not differ from the allocation achieved in the absence of contributions.

Minimizing the Price of Tranquility: How to Discourage Scotland's Secession from the United Kingdom

What some view as overly-generous funding of the Scottish parliament results from Scotland.s credible threat to secede from the United Kingdom. Scotland is shown to benefit from a second mover advantage in a non-cooperative sequential game over the allocation of public funds. Various reform proposals are criticized for not recognizing that reform of Scottish government finances must be consistent with Scotland.s credible threat. Fiscal autonomy -- in which the Scottish parliament finances a much greater proportion of its spending from Scottish-sourced taxes, is demonstrated to be a viable reform within the existing political context and, in some circumstances, could remove Scotland.s second mover advantage. We also use a cooperative bargaining game model to demonstrate that an Australian style grants commission would not be a viable reform in the British context.

Input Price Variation Across Locations and a Generalized Measure of Cost Efficiency

We propose a nonparametric model for global cost minimization as a framework for optimal allocation of a firm's output target across multiple locations, taking account of differences in input prices and technologies across locations. This should be useful for firms planning production sites within a country and for foreign direct investment decisions by multi-national firms. Two illustrative examples are included. The first example considers the production location decision of a manufacturing firm across a number of adjacent states of the US. In the other example, we consider the optimal allocation of US and Canadian automobile manufacturers across the two countries.

Regional Integration and Industrial Location in a Landlocked Spatial Economy

Regional integration proposals often require agreements between countries that differ in geographic size, resource endowments, transportation assets, technologies, and product quality. In this asymmetric setting, questions arise about the potential for mutual gains and the distribution of benefits among industries and workers in each country. This paper examines how regional integration between a small landlocked country and a large neighboring country--with a unique port facility that both nations must use to export goods--affects the wage and location decisions of firms, the allocation of labor, the welfare of each country's workers and firms, and aggregate measures of economic welfare in each country and the region. A simulated spatial labor market model is used to explore the economic effects of various stages of regional integration. Beginning with autarky as a benchmark case, we consider two forms of regional integration: partial mobility (mobile labor with geographically restricted firms); and full mobility (mobile labor and firms) with convergence of production technologies and product quality.

Can a Newly Proposed Mechanism for Allocating Contracts in U.S. Electricity Wholesale Markets Lead to Lower Prices? A Game Theoretic Analysis

This study of the wholesale electricity market compares the cost-minimizing performance of the auction mechanism currently in place in U.S. markets with the performance of a proposed replacement. The current mechanism chooses an allocation of contracts that minimizes a fictional cost calculated using pay-as-offer pricing. Then suppliers are paid the market clearing price. The proposed mechanism uses the market clearing price in the allocation phase as well as in the payment phase. In concentrated markets, the proposed mechanism outperforms the current mechanism even when strategic behavior by suppliers is taken into account. The advantage of the proposed mechanism increases with increased price competition.

What Is Known about Testing for Discrimination: Lessons Learned by Comparing across Different Markets

The paper provides a fairly comprehensive examination of recent empirical work on discrimination within economics. The three major analytical approaches considered are traditional regression analysis of outcomes, paired testing or audits, and finally analysis of performance where higher group performance suggests that a group has been treated disfavorably. The review covers research in the labor, credit, and consumption markets, as well as recent studies of discrimination within the legal system. The review suggests that the validity of interpreting observed racial differences as discrimination depends heavily on whether the analysis is based on a sample that is representative of a population of individuals or households or based on a sample of market transactions, as well as the analyst?s ability to control for heterogeneity within that sample. Heterogeneous firm behavior and differentiated products, such as those found in labor and housing markets, also can confound empirical analyses of discrimination by confusing the allocation of individuals across firms or products with disparate treatment or by ignoring disparate impacts that might arise based on that allocation.