Predicting State Allocation of Funds: The Case of John Rowland and his Hometown of Waterbury, Connecticut.

This study attempts to analyze the underlying factors and motives influencing the allocation of discretionary state expenditures. The fact that some cities receive more money than other cities begs the question of what accounts for this variation. After framing the provision of state money within the theoretical framework of political patronage, a case study of Governor Rowland’s tenure in office and the accompanying expenditures to Connecticut’s 17 largest cities from 1995 to 2004 was conducted to evaluate whether a disproportionate amount of money was given to Rowland’s hometown of Waterbury, Connecticut. Besides employing a statistical analysis that determined that cities with similar characteristics received different amounts of money, interviewing was conducted to identify reasons for such variation. The results indicate that Waterbury received a greater amount of money than was predicted based on the city’s economic and demographic characteristics, and that non-objective and biased factors such as favoritism, the need to reward political support, or the desire to increase political loyalty sometimes take precedence over more objective factors.

Automatic Stabilizer Feature of Fixed Exchange Rate Regimes in Emerging Markets

This paper shows that countries characterized by a financial accelerator mechanism may reverse the usual finding of the literature -- flexible exchange rate regimes do a worse job of insulating open economies from external shocks. I obtain this result with a calibrated small open economy model that endogenizes foreign interest rates by linking them to the banking sector's foreign currency leverage. This relationship renders exchange rate policy more important compared to the usual exogeneity assumption. I find empirical support for this prediction using the Local Projections method. Finally, 2nd order approximation to the model finds larger welfare losses under flexible regimes.