The Time-Series Properties on Housing Prices: A Case Study of the Southern California Market

We examine the time-series relationship between housing prices in eight Southern California metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs). First, we perform cointegration tests of the housing price indexes for the MSAs, finding seven cointegrating vectors. Thus, the evidence suggests that one common trend links the housing prices in these eight MSAs, a purchasing power parity finding for the housing prices in Southern California. Second, we perform temporal Granger causality tests revealing intertwined temporal relationships. The Santa Anna MSA leads the pack in temporally causing housing prices in six of the other seven MSAs, excluding only the San Luis Obispo MSA. The Oxnard MSA experienced the largest number of temporal effects from other MSAs, six of the seven, excluding only Los Angeles. The Santa Barbara MSA proved the most isolated in that it temporally caused housing prices in only two other MSAs (Los Angels and Oxnard) and housing prices in the Santa Anna MSA temporally caused prices in Santa Barbara. Third, we calculate out-of-sample forecasts in each MSA, using various vector autoregressive (VAR) and vector error-correction (VEC) models, as well as Bayesian, spatial, and causality versions of these models with various priors. Different specifications provide superior forecasts in the different MSAs. Finally, we consider the ability of theses time-series models to provide accurate out-of-sample predictions of turning points in housing prices that occurred in 2006:Q4. Recursive forecasts, where the sample is updated each quarter, provide reasonably good forecasts of turning points.

Can a Newly Proposed Mechanism for Allocating Contracts in U.S. Electricity Wholesale Markets Lead to Lower Prices? A Game Theoretic Analysis

This study of the wholesale electricity market compares the cost-minimizing performance of the auction mechanism currently in place in U.S. markets with the performance of a proposed replacement. The current mechanism chooses an allocation of contracts that minimizes a fictional cost calculated using pay-as-offer pricing. Then suppliers are paid the market clearing price. The proposed mechanism uses the market clearing price in the allocation phase as well as in the payment phase. In concentrated markets, the proposed mechanism outperforms the current mechanism even when strategic behavior by suppliers is taken into account. The advantage of the proposed mechanism increases with increased price competition.

The Long-Run Relationship between Money, Nominal GDP, and the Price Level in Venezuela: 1950 to 1996

This paper explores whether a significant long-run relationship exists between money and nominal GDP and between money and the price level in the Venezuelan economy. We apply time-series econometric techniques to annual data for the Venezuelan economy for 1950 to 1996. An important feature of our analysis is the use of tests for unit roots and cointegration with structural breaks. Certain characteristics of the Venezuelan experience suggest that structural breaks may be important. Since the economy depends heavily on oil revenue, oil price shocks have had important influences on most macroeconomic variables. Also since the economy possesses large foreign debt, the world debt crisis that exploded in 1982 had pervasive effects on the Venezuelan economy. Radical changes in economic policy and political instability may have also significantly affected the movement of the macroeconomy. We find that a long-run relationship exists between narrow money (M1) and nominal GDP, the GDP deflator, and the CPI when one makes allowances for one or two structural breaks. We do not find such long-run relationships when broad money (M2) is used.

Strategic Behavior in Day-Ahead and Real-Time Markets for Electricity: Offer Cost or Payment Cost Minimization?

This study compares the procurement cost-minimizing and productive efficiency performance of the auction mechanism used by independent system operators (ISOs) in wholesale electricity auction markets in the U.S. with that of a proposed alternative. The current practice allocates energy contracts as if the auction featured a discriminatory final payment method when, in fact, the markets are uniform price auctions. The proposed alternative explicitly accounts for the market clearing price during the allocation phase. We find that the proposed alternative largely outperforms the current practice on the basis of procurement costs in the context of simple auction markets featuring both day-ahead and real-time auctions and that the procurement cost advantage of the alternative is complete when we simulate the effects of increased competition. We also find that a trade-off between the objectives of procurement cost minimization and productive efficiency emerges in our simple auction markets and persists in the face of increased competition.

An Experimental Study of Complex-Offer Auctions: Payment Cost Minimization vs. Offer Cost Minimization

A Payment Cost Minimization (PCM) auction has been proposed as an alternative to the Offer Cost Minimization (OCM) auction to be used in wholesale electric power markets with the intention to lower the procurement cost of electricity. Efficiency concerns about this proposal have relied on the assumption of true production cost revelation. Using an experimental approach, I compare the two auctions, strictly controlling for the level of unilateral market power. A specific feature of these complex-offer auctions is that the sellers submit not only the quantities and the minimum prices at which they are willing to sell, but also the start-up fees that are designed to reimburse the fixed start-up costs of the generation plants. I find that both auctions result in start-up fees that are significantly higher than the start-up costs. Overall, the two auctions perform similarly in terms of procurement cost and efficiency. Surprisingly, I do not find a substantial difference between less market power and more market power designs. Both designs result in similar inefficiencies and equally higher procurement costs over the competitive prediction. The PCM auction tends to have lower price volatility than the OCM auction when the market power is minimal but this property vanishes in the designs with market power. These findings lead me to conclude that both the PCM and the OCM auctions do not belong to the class of truth revealing mechanisms and do not easily elicit competitive behavior.

Minimizing the Price of Tranquility: How to Discourage Scotland's Secession from the United Kingdom

What some view as overly-generous funding of the Scottish parliament results from Scotland.s credible threat to secede from the United Kingdom. Scotland is shown to benefit from a second mover advantage in a non-cooperative sequential game over the allocation of public funds. Various reform proposals are criticized for not recognizing that reform of Scottish government finances must be consistent with Scotland.s credible threat. Fiscal autonomy -- in which the Scottish parliament finances a much greater proportion of its spending from Scottish-sourced taxes, is demonstrated to be a viable reform within the existing political context and, in some circumstances, could remove Scotland.s second mover advantage. We also use a cooperative bargaining game model to demonstrate that an Australian style grants commission would not be a viable reform in the British context.

Efficiency in Deregulated Electricity Markets: Offer Cost Minimization vs. Payment Cost Minimization Auction

This study of the wholesale electricity market compares the efficiency performance of the auction mechanism currently in place in U.S. markets with the performance of a proposed mechanism. The analysis highlights the importance of considering strategic behavior when comparing different institutional systems. We find that in concentrated markets, neither auction mechanism can guarantee an efficient allocation. The advantage of the current mechanism increases with increased price competition if market demand is perfectly inelastic. However, if market demand has some responsiveness to price, the superiority of the current auction with respect to efficiency is not that obvious. We present a case where the proposed auction outperforms the current mechanism on efficiency even if all offers reflect true production costs. We also find that a market designer might face a choice problem with a tradeoff between lower electricity cost and production efficiency. Some implications for social welfare are discussed as well.

Simple-Offer vs. Complex-Offer Auctions in Deregulated Electricity Markets

In my recent experimental research of wholesale electricity auctions, I discovered that the complex structure of the offers leaves a lot of room for strategic behavior, which consequently leads to anti- competitive and inefficient outcomes in the market. A specific feature of these complex-offer auctions is that the sellers submit not only the quantities and the minimum prices at which they are willing to sell, but also the start-up fees that are designed to reimburse the fixed start-up costs of the generation plants. In this paper, using the experimental method I compare the performance of two complex-offer auctions (COAs) against the performance of a simple-offer auction (SOA), in which the sellers have to recover all their generation costs --- fixed and variable ---through a uniform market-clearing price. I find that the SOA significantly reduces consumer prices and lowers price volatility. It mitigates anti-competitive effects that are present in the COAs and achieves allocative efficiency more quickly.

Responding to Price Signals in Communal Agriculture: Shaker Hog Production, 1788-1850

Isolated Shaker communal farms stressed self-sufficiency as an ideal but carefully chose which goods to buy and sell in external markets and which to produce and consume themselves. We use records of hog slaughter weights to investigate the extent to which the Shakers incorporated market-based price information in determining production levels of a consumption good which they did not sell in external markets: pork. Granger causality tests indicate that Shaker pork production decisions were influenced as hypothesized, strongly by corn prices and weakly by pork prices. We infer that attention to opportunity costs of goods that they produced and consumed themselves was a likely factor aiding the longevity of Shaker communal societies.

Forecasting and Analyzing Economic Activity with Coincident and Leading Indexes: The Case of Connecticut

We develop coincident and leading employment indexes for the Connecticut economy. Four employment-related variables enter the coincident index while five employment-related variables enter the leading index. The peaks and troughs in the leading index lead the peaks and troughs in the coincident index by an average of 3 and 9 months. Finally, we use the leading index in vector-autoregressive (VAR) and Bayesian vector-autoregressive (BVAR) models to forecast the coincident index, nonfarm employment, and the unemployment rate.

Input Price Variation Across Locations and a Generalized Measure of Cost Efficiency

We propose a nonparametric model for global cost minimization as a framework for optimal allocation of a firm's output target across multiple locations, taking account of differences in input prices and technologies across locations. This should be useful for firms planning production sites within a country and for foreign direct investment decisions by multi-national firms. Two illustrative examples are included. The first example considers the production location decision of a manufacturing firm across a number of adjacent states of the US. In the other example, we consider the optimal allocation of US and Canadian automobile manufacturers across the two countries.