The Value of Waiting: Foreign Direct Investment with Uncertainty and Imperfect Local Knowledge

This paper examines the role of uncertainty and imperfect local knowledge in foreign direct investment. The main idea comes from the literature on investment under uncertainty, such as Pindyck (1991) and Dixit and Pindyck (1994). We empirically test .the value of waiting. with a dataset on foreign direct investment (FDI). Many factors (e.g., political and economic regulations) as well as uncertainty and the risks due to imperfect local knowledge, determine the attractiveness of FDI. The uncertainty and irreversibility of FDI links the time interval between permission and actual execution of such FDI with explanatory variables, including information on foreign (home) countries and domestic industries. Common factors, such as regulatory change and external shocks, may affect the uncertainty when foreign investors make irreversible FDI decisions. We derive testable hypotheses from models of investment under uncertainty to determine those possible factors that induce delays in FDI, using Korean data over 1962 to 2001.

An Equilibrium Model of Lawmaking

This paper embeds a model of lawmaking in an equilibrium framework in which the demand for trials is rationed by court delay. The lawmaking process depends on a combination of selective litigation, judicial bias, and precedent. The steady state equilibrium of the model determines both the length of delay and the distribution of legal rules. Comparative statics show that an increase in the supply of trials reduces delay but may or may not increase the proportion of efficient rules. An increase in the fraction of judges biased in favor of the efficient rule, however, will likely improve efficiency on both counts.

Measuring Unemployment Insurance Generosity

In this paper, we develop a methodology to summarize the various policy parameters of an unemployment insurance scheme into a single generosity parameter. Unemployment insurance policies are multdimensional objects. They are typically defined by waiting periods, eligibility duration, benefit levels and asset tests when eligible, which makes intertemporal or international comparisons difficult. To make things worse, labor market conditions, such as the likelihood and duration of unemployment matter when assessing the generosity of different policies. We build a first model with such complex characteristics. Our model features heterogeneous agents that are liquidity constrained but can self-insure. We then build a second model that is similar, except that the unemployment insurance is simpler: it is deprived of waiting periods and agents are eligible forever with constant benefits. We then determine which level of benefits in this second model makes agents indifferent between both unemployment insurance policies. We apply this strategy to the unemployment insurance program of the United Kingdom and study how its generosity evolved over time.

Barriers to Timely Screening Colonoscopy

Objective: Colorectal cancer (CRC) can be largely prevented or effectively treated in its early stages, yet disparities exist in timely screening. The aim of this study was to explore the disparities in CRC screening on the basis of health insurance status including private, Medicare, Medicaid, and State Administered General Assistance (SAGA). Methods: A retrospective chart review for the period January 2000 to May 2007 (95 records) was conducted at two clinic sites; a private clinic and a university hospital clinic. All individuals at these sites who met study criteria (>50 years old with screening colonoscopy) were included. Age, gender, date of first clinic visit when screening referral was made, and date of completed procedure (screening colonoscopy) were recorded. Groups were dichotomized between individuals with private health insurance and individuals with public health insurance. Individuals with any history of CRC, known pre-cancerous conditions as well as family history of CRC requiring frequent colonoscopy were excluded from the study. Linear model analysis was performed to compare the average waiting time to receiving screening colonoscopy between the groups. T-test was performed to analyze age or gender related differences between the two groups as well as within each group. Results: The average waiting time (33 days) for screening colonoscopy in privately insured individuals was significantly lower than publicly insured individuals (200 days). The time difference between the first clinic visit and the procedure was statistically significant (p < 0.0001) between the two groups. There was no statistical difference (p=0.089) in gender between these groups (public vs. private). There were also no statistically significant gender or age related differences found within each group. Conclusions: Disparities exist in timely screening for CRC and one of the barriers leading to delayed CRC screening includes health insurance status of an individual. Even within the insured group, type of insurance plays major role. There is a negative correlation between public health insurance status and timely screening. Differences in access to medical care and delivery of care experienced by patients who are publicly insured through Medicaid, Medicare, and SAGA, suggests that the State of Connecticut needs to implement changes in health care policies that would provide timely screening colonoscopy. It is evident that health insurance coverage facilitates timely access to healthcare. Therefore, there is a need for increased efforts in advocacy for policy, payment and physician participation in public insurance programs. A state-wide comprehensive program involving multiple components targeting different levels of change such as provider, patients and the community should help reduce some of the observed causes of healthcare disparities based on the insurance status.