Financial Liberalization and Inflationary Dynamics in the Context of a Small Open Economy

The paper develops a short-run model of a small open financially repressed economy characterized by unorganized money markets, capital good imports, capital mobility, wage indexation, and flexible exchange rates. The analysis shows that financial liberalization, in the form of an increased rate of interest on deposits and tight monetary policy, unambiguously and unconditionally causes deflation. Moreover, the results do not depend on the degree of capital mobility and structure of wage setting. The paper recommends that a small open developing economy should deregulate interest rates and tighten monetary policy if reducing inflation is a priority. The pre-requisite for such a policy, however, requires the establishment of a flexible exchange rate regime.

The Effects of Trade Orientation and Human Capital on Total Factor Productivity

We study the effects of trade orientation and human capital on total factor productivity for a pooled cross-section, time-series sample of developed and developing countries. We first estimate total factor productivity from a parsimonious specification of the aggregate production function involving output per worker, capital per worker, and the labor force, both with and without the stock of human capital. Then we consider a number of potential determinants of total factor productivity growth including several measures of trade orientation as well as a measure of human capital. We find that a high degree of openness benefits total factor productivity and that human capital contributes to total factor productivity only after our measure of openness passes some threshold level. Before that threshold, increases in human capital actually depress total factor productivity. Finally, we also consider the issue of convergence of real GDP per worker and total factor productivity, finding more evidence of convergence for the latter than for the former.

Antidumping as Strategic Trade Policy Under Asymmetric Information

In the last two decades, trade liberalization under GATT/WTO has been partly offset by an increase in antidumping protection. Economists have argued convincingly that this is partly due to the inclusion of sales below cost in the definition of dumping during the GATT Tokyo Round. The introduction of the cost- based dumping definition gives regulating authorities a better opportunity to choose protection according to their liking. This paper investigates the domestic government's antidumping duty choice in an asymmetric information framework where the foreign firm's cost is observed by the domestic firm, but not by the government. To induce truthful revelation, the government can design a tariff schedule, contingent on firms' cost reports, accompanied by a threat to collect additional information for report verification (i.e., auditing) and, in case misreporting is detected, to set penalty duties. We show that depending on the concrete assumptions, the domestic government may not only be able to extract the true cost information, but also succeeds in implementing the full-information, governmental welfare-maximizing duty. In this case, the antidumping framework within GATT/WTO does not only offer the means to pursue strategic trade policy disguised as fair trade policy, but it also helps overcome the informational problems with regard to correctly determining the optimal strategic trade policy.