2 resultados para Version Control
em University of Connecticut - USA
Resumo:
This study tested the hypothesis that career indecisiveness among men tends to be associated with different levels of self-reported psychological adjustment and with different remembrances of parental (maternal and paternal) acceptance and behavioral control in childhood from those of women. One hundred twenty-six respondents ages 17 through 54 (M = 23.7 years, SD = 8.21 years) participated in this study. Thirty-seven where males; 90 were females. Measures used in this study included the Career Decision Scale, the Adult version of the Parental Acceptance-Rejection/Control Questionnaire for mothers and for fathers, and the Adult version of the Personality Assessment Questionnaire. Both men and women remembered their mothers as well as their fathers as being loving in childhood. Additionally, men and women remembered both parents as being moderately behaviorally controlling in childhood. Finally, both men and women reported a fair level of psychological maladjustment. And on average, both men and women were fairly indecisive about their careers. Results of analyses supported the hypothesis in that career indecisiveness among women but not men was significantly correlated with remembered maternal and paternal acceptance in childhood, as well as with self-reported psychological adjustment and age. However, only women’s self-reported psychological adjustment made a significant and unique contribution to variations in their reports of career indecisiveness. None of the predictor variables were significantly associated with career indecisiveness among men.
Resumo:
The paper investigates alternative policies to regulate emissions from polluting product markets, specifically considering the case of the automobiles market. The two policies we consider are: a quota that limits the quantity produced of the polluting model and a more flexible average efficiency standard that requires a minimum energy efficiency across all models produced by a firm, similar to the US Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards. We use a duopoly model of vertical differentiation where firms produce both an economy (i.e., low polluting) version and a luxury (i.e., high polluting) version of a given product. We show that while a quota can raise firm profit over a certain range, CAFE always reduces firm profit relative to the pre-regulation. We also show that while the quota reduces emissions, it is possible that emissions increase under CAFE. The optimal policy choice will depend on the magnitude of unit damages. We show that when unit damages are sufficiently high, the quota policy is more efficient than the average efficiency standard. This suggests that instead of tightening CAFE to limit damages from emissions, policy makers can shift to a quota policy which is both welfare enhancing and more profitable for firms.