Property Law

This chapter examines the economics of property rights and property law. Property law is a fundamental part of social organization and is also fundamental to the operation of the economy because it defines and protects the bundle of rights that constitute property. Property law thereby creates incentives to protect and invest in assets and establishes a legal framework within which market exchange of assets can take place. The purpose of this chapter is to show how the economics of property rights can be used to understand fundamental features of property law and related extra-legal institutions. The chapter will both examine the rationale for legal doctrine and the effects of legal doctrine regarding the exercise, enforcement, and transfer of rights. It will also examine various property rights regimes including open access, private ownership, common property and state property. The guiding questions are: How are property rights established? What explains the variation in the types of property rights? What governs the use and transfer of rights? And, how are property rights enforced?

The Performance of Domestic and Foreign Banks: The Case of Korea and the Asian Financial Crisis

This paper considers the performance of banks, domestic and foreign, in Korea prior to, during, and immediately after the Asian financial crisis, examining how the profitability of those banks differed and identifying factors that explain why those differences existed. The performance of Korean banks deteriorated dramatically in 1998 with most banks recovering somewhat in 1999. Foreign banks did not experience the same negative effect on their returns on assets and equity as a rule. Several standard findings emerge. For example, equity to assets correlates positively with domestic, but not foreign, bank performance, as measured by the returns on assets and equity, even when the government recapitalized institutions that were performing quite badly. Also, foreign-currency deposits significantly and negatively correlate with domestic Korean bank performance, although only in the post-crisis period for regional banks. In sum, the domestic Korean banks suffered more severely from the Asian financial crisis than foreign banks.

Economies of Scale and Cost Efficiencies: A Panel-Data Stochastic-Frontier Analysis of Real Estate Investment Trusts

This paper extends the existing research on real estate investment trust (REIT) operating efficiencies. We estimate a stochastic-frontier panel-data model specifying a translog cost function, covering 1995 to 2003. The results disagree with previous research in that we find little evidence of scale economies and some evidence of scale diseconomies. Moreover, we also generally find smaller inefficiencies than those shown by other REIT studies. Contrary to previous research, the results also show that self-management of a REIT associates with more inefficiency when we measure output with assets. When we use revenue to measure output, selfmanagement associates with less inefficiency. Also contrary with previous research, higher leverage associates with more efficiency. The results further suggest that inefficiency increases over time in three of our four specifications.

The Effect of the Asian Financial Crisis on the Performance of Korean Nationwide Banks

The Asian financial crisis spread its effect quickly across a number of countries. Korea faced serious problems in her financial and corporate sectors. This paper considers the performance of Korean nationwide banks before, during, and immediately after the Asian financial crisis. The performance of Korean nationwide banks took a big hit in 1998. Most banks recovered somewhat in 1999 with the notable exception of the further deterioration of Seoul. Several factors possess strong correlations with bank performance. Among other standard findings, equity to assets correlates positively with bank performance, even when the government recapitalized a number of institutions that performed poorly. The Asian crisis did not affect the normal rules of good bank management. The government, however, directly intervened in the banking sector on a large scale to limit the scope of the crisis in the Korean economy.

Do Exposure Suits Produce a 'Race to File'? An Economic Analysis of a Tort for Risk

Conventional tort law does not allow victims of exposure to a toxic substance to seek compensation until they develop actual symptoms of illness. This may effectively bar recovery because at the time the illness arises, injurers may be judgment proof. One possible response is to allow a tort for risk that allows victims to seek expected damages at the time of exposure. However, critics charge that this could create a 'race to file' wherein victims rush to file suit to ensure that they will get a share of the injurer's limited assets. We show that such a race may or may not occur in equilibrium, and that when it does occur, not all victims choose to file at exposure if bankruptcy is an inevitable result. If bankruptcy is not inevitable, it is possible that a tort for risk will trigger bankruptcy, although a no-bankruptcy equilibrium always exists and Paretodominates the bankruptcy equilibrium. We examine the consequences of the various tort-for-risk equilibria on the compensation of exposure victims, litigation costs, and injurer care.

On the Way to Becoming Global Citizens: Use of ICT by Ukrainian Students

Information is one of the important assets in today's society. Information and communication technologies (ICT) may be particular important for students as one of the tools to become global citizens. The objective of this study was to investigate use of ICT by high school students (n=122) from Ukraine, a developing country. The analysis indicates that majority of students from Ukraine have computer at home and more than half of students have the Internet access at home. In addition, gender differences in the use of computer and the Internet were identified. Educational implications and future directions are discussed.

The Secret Life of Mundane Transaction Costs

Transaction costs, one often hears, are the economic equivalent of friction in physical systems. Like physicists, economists can sometimes neglect friction in formulating theories; but like engineers, they can never neglect friction in studying how the system actually does let alone should work. Interestingly, however, the present-day economics of organization also ignores friction. That is, almost single-mindedly, the literature analyzes transactions from the point of view of misaligned incentives and (especially) transaction-specific assets. The costs involved are certainly costs of running the economic system in some sense, but they are not obviously frictions. Stories about frictions in trade are not nearly as intriguing as stories about guileful trading partners and expensive assets placed at risk. But I will argue that these seemingly dull categories of cost what Baldwin and Clark (2003) call mundane transaction costs actually have a secret life. They are at least as important as, and quite probably far more important than, the more glamorous costs of asset specificity in explaining the partition between firm and market. These costs also have a secret life in another sense: they have a secret life cycle. I will argue that these mundane transaction costs provide much better material for helping us understanding how the boundaries among firms, markets, and hybrid forms change over time.