The Relationship of Student Demographics to 10th Grade MCAS Test Anxiety

The intensification of consequential testing situations is associated with an increase in anxiety among American students (Casbarro, 2005). Test anxiety can have negative effects on student test performance (Everson, Millsap, & Rodriguez, 1991). If test anxiety has the potential to decrease students’ test scores, it becomes a factor that can threaten the validity of any inferences drawn between test scores and student progress (Cizek & Burg, 2006). There are several factors that relate closely to test anxiety (Cizek & Burg, 2006). Variables of key influence include gender, socioeconomic status, and teacher-manifested anxiety (Hembree, 1988). Another influence upon test anxiety is students’ participation in academic support programs to prepare them for exit examinations. The purpose of this study was to examine the relationship between 10th grade high school student gender, socioeconomic status, perceived teacher anxiety, and student preparedness with levels of the Massachusetts Comprehensive Assessment System (MCAS) test anxiety. It appears that few studies have examined levels of high school test anxiety in regards to this specific high-stakes MCAS exit exam required for high school graduation. A two-phase sequential mixed-methods research design was used to survey (N=156) 10th grade students represented by a sampling of (n=80) students with low socioeconomic status and (n=76) students with high socioeconomic status regarding their levels of test anxiety in relation to upcoming MCAS testing. A multiple regression analysis was used to measure the relationship between the predictor variables (gender, socioeconomic status, perceived teacher anxiety, and student preparedness) with the criterion variable of student test anxiety using the Test Anxiety Inventory (TAI). Personal interviews with (n=20) volunteer students provided rich explanations of students’ academic self-efficacy, their perceptions of their performance on the upcoming MCAS exam, and their use of strategies to reduce their levels of test anxiety. Personal interviews with (n=12) volunteer school administrators and teachers provided descriptions of their perceptions of how test anxiety affected their students’ performance. A major quantitative finding of this study was that the variables of student socioeconomic status and student ratings of teacher anxiety accounted for the variance in students’ levels of surveyed test anxiety (R2 = .06, p = .033, small to medium effect size). These results indicate that different student populations vary in their readiness skills to successfully participate in consequential testing situations. Consequently, high-test anxious students would require emotional preparation as well as academic preparation when confronting high-stakes testing. The results have the potential to re-shape the format of schools’ MCAS test preparation efforts.

An Experimental Study of Complex-Offer Auctions: Payment Cost Minimization vs. Offer Cost Minimization

A Payment Cost Minimization (PCM) auction has been proposed as an alternative to the Offer Cost Minimization (OCM) auction to be used in wholesale electric power markets with the intention to lower the procurement cost of electricity. Efficiency concerns about this proposal have relied on the assumption of true production cost revelation. Using an experimental approach, I compare the two auctions, strictly controlling for the level of unilateral market power. A specific feature of these complex-offer auctions is that the sellers submit not only the quantities and the minimum prices at which they are willing to sell, but also the start-up fees that are designed to reimburse the fixed start-up costs of the generation plants. I find that both auctions result in start-up fees that are significantly higher than the start-up costs. Overall, the two auctions perform similarly in terms of procurement cost and efficiency. Surprisingly, I do not find a substantial difference between less market power and more market power designs. Both designs result in similar inefficiencies and equally higher procurement costs over the competitive prediction. The PCM auction tends to have lower price volatility than the OCM auction when the market power is minimal but this property vanishes in the designs with market power. These findings lead me to conclude that both the PCM and the OCM auctions do not belong to the class of truth revealing mechanisms and do not easily elicit competitive behavior.

Simple-Offer vs. Complex-Offer Auctions in Deregulated Electricity Markets

In my recent experimental research of wholesale electricity auctions, I discovered that the complex structure of the offers leaves a lot of room for strategic behavior, which consequently leads to anti- competitive and inefficient outcomes in the market. A specific feature of these complex-offer auctions is that the sellers submit not only the quantities and the minimum prices at which they are willing to sell, but also the start-up fees that are designed to reimburse the fixed start-up costs of the generation plants. In this paper, using the experimental method I compare the performance of two complex-offer auctions (COAs) against the performance of a simple-offer auction (SOA), in which the sellers have to recover all their generation costs --- fixed and variable ---through a uniform market-clearing price. I find that the SOA significantly reduces consumer prices and lowers price volatility. It mitigates anti-competitive effects that are present in the COAs and achieves allocative efficiency more quickly.