Transaction Costs, Production Costs, and the Passage of Time

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The Secret Life of Mundane Transaction Costs

Transaction costs, one often hears, are the economic equivalent of friction in physical systems. Like physicists, economists can sometimes neglect friction in formulating theories; but like engineers, they can never neglect friction in studying how the system actually does let alone should work. Interestingly, however, the present-day economics of organization also ignores friction. That is, almost single-mindedly, the literature analyzes transactions from the point of view of misaligned incentives and (especially) transaction-specific assets. The costs involved are certainly costs of running the economic system in some sense, but they are not obviously frictions. Stories about frictions in trade are not nearly as intriguing as stories about guileful trading partners and expensive assets placed at risk. But I will argue that these seemingly dull categories of cost what Baldwin and Clark (2003) call mundane transaction costs actually have a secret life. They are at least as important as, and quite probably far more important than, the more glamorous costs of asset specificity in explaining the partition between firm and market. These costs also have a secret life in another sense: they have a secret life cycle. I will argue that these mundane transaction costs provide much better material for helping us understanding how the boundaries among firms, markets, and hybrid forms change over time.

Risk, Transaction Costs, and Tax Assignment: Government Finance in the Ottoman Empire

Risk and transaction costs often provide competing explanations of institutional outcomes. In this paper we argue that they offer opposing predictions regarding the assignment of fixed and variable taxes in a multi-tiered governmental structure. While the central government can pool regional risks from variable taxes, local governments can measure variable tax bases more accurately. Evidence on tax assignment from the mid-sixteenth century Ottoman Empire supports the transaction cost explanation, suggesting that risk matters less because insurance can be obtained in a variety of ways.

The Entrepreneurial Theory of the Firm and the Theory of the Entrepreneurial Firm

The entrepreneurial theory of the firm argues that entrepreneurship, properly understood, is a crucial but neglected element in explaining the nature and boundaries of the firm. By contrast, the theory of the entrepreneurial firm presumably seeks not to understand the nature and boundaries of "the firm" in general but rather to understand a particular type of firm: one that is entrepreneurial. This paper is an attempt to reconcile the two. After briefly delving for the concept of entrepreneurship in the work of Schumpeter, Kirzner, and (especially) Knight, the paper makes the case for the entrepreneurial theory of the firm. In such a theory, the firm exists as the solution to a coordination problem in a world of change and uncertainty, including Knightian or structural uncertainty. Taking a historical or developmental perspective, the paper then examines the changing nature of the entrepreneurial coordination problem over the life-cycle. In this formulation, "the entrepreneurial firm" is a nascent firm or proto-firm facing a problem of coordinating systemic change in economic capabilities. Lacking (by definition) adequate guidance from existing systems of rules of conduct embedded in markets or organizations, the entrepreneurial firm typically relies on a form of organization Max Weber called charismatic authority. In the end, although there is no such thing as a non-entrepreneurial firm, firms that must solve coordination problems in a world of novelty and systemic change ("entrepreneurial firms") are perhaps the purest case of the entrepreneurial theory of the firm.

A New Economic Analysis of the American Revolution

We offer an analysis of the American Revolution in which actors are modeled as choosing the sovereign organization that maximizes their net expected benefits. Benefits of secession derive from satisfaction of greed and settlement of grievance. Costs derive from the cost of civil war and lost benefit of Empire membership. When expected net benefits are positive for both secessionists and the Empire civil war ensues, otherwise it is settled or never begins in the first place. The novelty of our discussion is to show how diverse economic and non-economic factors (such as pamphleteering by Thomas Paine and the morale of the Revolutionary forces) can be integrated into a single economic model.

Property Law

This chapter examines the economics of property rights and property law. Property law is a fundamental part of social organization and is also fundamental to the operation of the economy because it defines and protects the bundle of rights that constitute property. Property law thereby creates incentives to protect and invest in assets and establishes a legal framework within which market exchange of assets can take place. The purpose of this chapter is to show how the economics of property rights can be used to understand fundamental features of property law and related extra-legal institutions. The chapter will both examine the rationale for legal doctrine and the effects of legal doctrine regarding the exercise, enforcement, and transfer of rights. It will also examine various property rights regimes including open access, private ownership, common property and state property. The guiding questions are: How are property rights established? What explains the variation in the types of property rights? What governs the use and transfer of rights? And, how are property rights enforced?

Scaling the Costs of 404 Testing to Fit the Needs of Small Public Companies

In July of 2002, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was passed by Congress, including section 404 which requires the auditors to test and opine on the company's internal controls. Since that time there has been much debate about whether the intended benefits of increased investor confidence and financial statement transparency trump the unexpectedly high compliance costs, especially for public companies with market-caps less than $75 million. Before these companies begin complying in the upcoming year, interest groups are calling for the requirements to be 'scaled' to better fit the needs of these companies. While auditors already are expected to scale their audit approach to each individual client, more must be done to significantly decrease the costs in order to reverse the trend of small companies foregoing listing on U.S. capital markets. Increased guidance from the PCAOB, SEC, and other related parties could help the small-cap companies and their auditors be aware of best practices. Also, exempting industries that already follow similar guidelines or are significantly injured by the compliance requirements could help. Lastly, the controversial proposal of rotational audits could be put in place if the affected parties cooperate to remove the undue burden on these small-cap companies. Without some form of significant action, the investors could soon lose the ability to buy small-cap companies in U.S. markets.

Monetary Policy Delegation, Contract Costs, and Contract Targets

We reconsider the optimal central banker contract derived in Walsh (1995). We show that if the government's objective function places weight (value) on the cost of the contract, then the optimal inflation contract does not completely neutralize the inflation bias. That is, a fraction of the inflation bias emerges in the resulting inflation rate after the central banker's monetary policy decision. Furthermore, the more concerned the government is about the cost of the contract or the less selfish (more benevolent) is the central banker, the smaller is the share of the inflation bias eliminated by the contract. No matter how concerned the government is about the cost of the contract or how unselfish (benevolent) the central banker is, the contract always reduces the inflationary bias by at least half. Finally, a central banker contract written in terms of output (i.e., incorporating an output target) can completely eradicate the inflationary bias, regardless of concerns about contract costs.

Varying Injurer Costs of Care, Negligence, and Self-Selection

Standard economic models of negligence set a single standard of care to which all injurers must conform. When injurers differ in their costs of care, this leads to distortions in individual care choices. This paper derives the characteristics of a negligence rule that induces optimal care by all injurers by means of self-selection. The principal features of the rule are (1) the due standard is set at the optimal care of the lowest cost injurer, and (2) liability increases gradually rather than abruptly as care falls below this standard. The results are consistent with the gradation in liability under certain causation rules and under comparative negligence.

Bilateral Accidents with Intrinsically Interdependent Costs of Precaution

The standard economic model of bilateral precaution postulates an interdependency between the care taken by injurers and victims that operates through the effects of each on the expected accident loss. This paper considers situations in which each party's precaution affects not only expected accident loss, but also directly affects the other party's cost of taking precaution. Generalizing the economic model of tort law in this way allows for a more complete analysis of when standard tort rules can and cannot induce optimal precaution. When this additional externality is introduced into a model of unilateral harm (where all accident losses are borne by the victim), none of the standard tort liability rules induces socially optimal behavior by both parties. Moreover, under a contributory negligence rule, the only equilibrium is in mixed strategies; this gives rise to the possibility of litigation in equilibrium. A 'tort-like' liability rule that induces socially optimal behavior by both parties is then characterized; this involves a payment by victims to non-negligent injurers whenever an accident occurs. The model is then extended to consider the case of bilateral harm (where both parties suffer accident losses). It is shown that, as long as both parties can sue to recover their accident losses, all negligence-based tort rules lead to socially optimal behavior by both parties.

Bankruptcy Costs, Liability Dollarization, and Vulnerability to Sudden Stops

Emerging market countries that have improved institutions and attained intermediate levels of institutional quality have experienced severe financial crises following capital flow reversals. However, there is also evidence that countries with strong institutions and deep capital markets are less affected by external shocks. We reconcile these two observations using a calibrated DSGE model that extends the financial accelerator framework developed in Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999). The model captures financial market institutional quality with creditors. ability to recover assets from bankrupt firms. Bankruptcy costs affect vulnerability to sudden stops directly but also indirectly by affecting the degree of liability dollarization. Simulations reveal an inverted U-shaped relationship between bankruptcy recovery rates and the output loss following sudden stops. We provide empirical evidence that this non-linear relationship exists.