The Entrepreneurial Theory of the Firm and the Theory of the Entrepreneurial Firm

The entrepreneurial theory of the firm argues that entrepreneurship, properly understood, is a crucial but neglected element in explaining the nature and boundaries of the firm. By contrast, the theory of the entrepreneurial firm presumably seeks not to understand the nature and boundaries of "the firm" in general but rather to understand a particular type of firm: one that is entrepreneurial. This paper is an attempt to reconcile the two. After briefly delving for the concept of entrepreneurship in the work of Schumpeter, Kirzner, and (especially) Knight, the paper makes the case for the entrepreneurial theory of the firm. In such a theory, the firm exists as the solution to a coordination problem in a world of change and uncertainty, including Knightian or structural uncertainty. Taking a historical or developmental perspective, the paper then examines the changing nature of the entrepreneurial coordination problem over the life-cycle. In this formulation, "the entrepreneurial firm" is a nascent firm or proto-firm facing a problem of coordinating systemic change in economic capabilities. Lacking (by definition) adequate guidance from existing systems of rules of conduct embedded in markets or organizations, the entrepreneurial firm typically relies on a form of organization Max Weber called charismatic authority. In the end, although there is no such thing as a non-entrepreneurial firm, firms that must solve coordination problems in a world of novelty and systemic change ("entrepreneurial firms") are perhaps the purest case of the entrepreneurial theory of the firm.

Deterrence and Incapacitation: Towards a Unified Theory of Criminal Punishment

Economic models of crime have focused primarily on the goal of deterrence; the goal of incapacitation has received much less attention. This paper adapts the standard deterrence model to incorporate incapacitation. When prison only is used, incapacitation can result in a longer or a shorter optimal prison term compared to the deterrence-only model. It is longer if there is underdeterrence, and shorter if there is overdeterrence. In contrast, when a fine is available and it is not constrained by the offender's wealth, the optimal prison term is zero. Since the fine achieves first-best deterrence, only efficient crimes are committed and hence, there is no gain from incapacitation.

Effects of Food Primes and Thought Suppression on Eating Habits

Food primes and thought suppression have been identified as factors influencing poor eating choices. Primes affect people non-consciously by activating thoughts of food. Suppression of food thoughts leads to a preoccupation with food that is often followed by a hyperaccessibility of food thoughts and increased binging. The current study paired these two processes to examine their interactional effects. We manipulated exposure to food primes and instructions to suppress thoughts of a tasty snack food (M&Ms) for 76 college-aged women. We hypothesized that participants both primed with food images and asked to suppress would consume the most M&Ms at the end of the study. Contrary to predictions, results showed no effects for the manipulations. Perceived weight category, however, did interact with the manipulations, with overweight participants eating more when they got either the food prime or the suppression (but not both together). These findings have important implications for weight-loss strategies.