From Truth to Justice: How Does Amnesty Factor In? A Comparative Analysis of South Africa and Sierra Leone's Truth and Reconciliation Commissions

Truth and Reconciliation Commissions (TRC) have emerged in the last few decades as a mechanism for a state to overcome widespread, grave, human rights violations. There are numerous approaches to a TRC all with an ultimate goal: that formerly warring factions, perpetrators, witnesses, and victims can move forward as a united people. I propose that the provision of amnesty is critical to the success of a TRC. I hypothesize that the form of amnesty chosen (i.e. blanket v. conditional amnesty) determines the revelation of truth and realization of justice, which in turn dictates whether a TRC can achieve reconciliation. To test this hypothesis, I use two case studies: South Africa, which has utilized conditional amnesty, and Sierra Leone which has employed blanket amnesty. I create a model for measuring reconciliation. I can then look at the implications of both types of amnesty and assess which, in the end, is more effective. My overarching conclusion is that the provision of conditional amnesty is more effective than blanket amnesty in achieving reconciliation. Ultimately, I hope that this conclusion can be generalized to other TRCs.

An Experimental Study of Complex-Offer Auctions: Payment Cost Minimization vs. Offer Cost Minimization

A Payment Cost Minimization (PCM) auction has been proposed as an alternative to the Offer Cost Minimization (OCM) auction to be used in wholesale electric power markets with the intention to lower the procurement cost of electricity. Efficiency concerns about this proposal have relied on the assumption of true production cost revelation. Using an experimental approach, I compare the two auctions, strictly controlling for the level of unilateral market power. A specific feature of these complex-offer auctions is that the sellers submit not only the quantities and the minimum prices at which they are willing to sell, but also the start-up fees that are designed to reimburse the fixed start-up costs of the generation plants. I find that both auctions result in start-up fees that are significantly higher than the start-up costs. Overall, the two auctions perform similarly in terms of procurement cost and efficiency. Surprisingly, I do not find a substantial difference between less market power and more market power designs. Both designs result in similar inefficiencies and equally higher procurement costs over the competitive prediction. The PCM auction tends to have lower price volatility than the OCM auction when the market power is minimal but this property vanishes in the designs with market power. These findings lead me to conclude that both the PCM and the OCM auctions do not belong to the class of truth revealing mechanisms and do not easily elicit competitive behavior.

Search, Seizure and (False?) Arrest: An Analysis of Fourth Amendment Remedies when Police can Plant Evidence

The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures in criminal investigations. The Supreme Court has interpreted this to require that police obtain a warrant prior to search and that illegally seized evidence be excluded from trial. A consensus has developed in the law and economics literature that tort liability for police officers is a superior means of deterring unreasonable searches. We argue that this conclusion depends on the assumption of truth-seeking police, and develop a game-theoretic model to compare the two remedies when some police officers (the bad type) are willing to plant evidence in order to obtain convictions, even though other police (the good type) are not (where this type is private information). We characterize the perfect Bayesian equilibria of the asymmetric-information game between the police and a court that seeks to minimize error costs in deciding whether to convict or acquit suspects. In this framework, we show that the exclusionary rule with a warrant requirement leads to superior outcomes (relative to tort liability) in terms of truth-finding function of courts, because the warrant requirement can reduce the scope for bad types of police to plant evidence