Expectations, and Credibility in a Model of Monetary Policy

Recent monetary history has been characterized by monetary authorities which have been, alternatively hard and soft on inflation. In a vintage capital framework, investment decisions are not easily reversed. Therefore, expectations of policy as well as current policy are important to the investment decision. Here, a vintage capital model is used to assess the value of central bank credibility for a policy change. Policy in this model is assumed to be private information of the central banker. Agents learn about that policy which to study the ensuing transitional dynamics following a change in monetary policy regime.

Monetary Policy in a Portfolio Balance Model with Endogenous Physical Capital

We develop a portfolio balance model with real capital accumulation. The introduction of real capital as an asset as well as a good produced and demanded by firms enriches extant portfolio balance models of exchange rate determination. We show that expansionary monetary policy causes exchange rate overshooting, not once, but twice; the secondary repercussion comes through the reaction of firms to changed asset prices and the firms' decisions to invest in real capital. The model sheds further light on the volatility of real and nominal exchange rates, and it suggests that changes in corporate sector profitability may affect exchange rates through portfolio diversification in corporate securities.

Monetary Policy Delegation, Contract Costs, and Contract Targets

We reconsider the optimal central banker contract derived in Walsh (1995). We show that if the government's objective function places weight (value) on the cost of the contract, then the optimal inflation contract does not completely neutralize the inflation bias. That is, a fraction of the inflation bias emerges in the resulting inflation rate after the central banker's monetary policy decision. Furthermore, the more concerned the government is about the cost of the contract or the less selfish (more benevolent) is the central banker, the smaller is the share of the inflation bias eliminated by the contract. No matter how concerned the government is about the cost of the contract or how unselfish (benevolent) the central banker is, the contract always reduces the inflationary bias by at least half. Finally, a central banker contract written in terms of output (i.e., incorporating an output target) can completely eradicate the inflationary bias, regardless of concerns about contract costs.

Monetary Policy, Exchange Rate Overshooting, and Endogenous Physical Capital

We develop an open economy macroeconomic model with real capital accumulation and microeconomic foundations. We show that expansionary monetary policy causes exchange rate overshooting, not once, but potentially twice; the secondary repercussion comes through the reaction of firms to changed asset prices and the firms' decisions to invest in real capital. The model sheds further light on the volatility of real and nominal exchange rates, and it suggests that changes in corporate sector profitability may affect exchange rates through international portfolio diversification in corporate securities.

The Making of Optimal and Consistent Policy: An Implementation Theory Framework for Monetary Policy

This paper shows that optimal policy and consistent policy outcomes require the use of control-theory and game-theory solution techniques. While optimal policy and consistent policy often produce different outcomes even in a one-period model, we analyze consistent policy and its outcome in a simple model, finding that the cause of the inconsistency with optimal policy traces to inconsistent targets in the social loss function. As a result, the social loss function cannot serve as a direct loss function for the central bank. Accordingly, we employ implementation theory to design a central bank loss function (mechanism design) with consistent targets, while the social loss function serves as a social welfare criterion. That is, with the correct mechanism design for the central bank loss function, optimal policy and consistent policy become identical. In other words, optimal policy proves implementable (consistent).

Consistent Targets and Optimal Monetary Policy: A Note

Kydland and Prescott (1977) develop a simple model of monetary policy making, where the central bank needs some commitment technique to achieve optimal monetary policy over time. Although not their main focus, they illustrate the difference between consistent and optimal policy in a sequential-decision one-period world. We employ the analytical method developed in Yuan and Miller (2005), whereby the government appoints a central bank with consistent targets or delegates consistent targets to the central bank. Thus, the central bank s welfare function differs from the social welfare function, which cause consistent policy to prove optimal.

Total Factor Productivity and Monetary Policy: Evidence from Conditional Volatility

This paper empirically assesses whether monetary policy affects real economic activity through its affect on the aggregate supply side of the macroeconomy. Analysts typically argue that monetary policy either does not affect the real economy, the classical dichotomy, or only affects the real economy in the short run through aggregate demand new Keynesian or new classical theories. Real business cycle theorists try to explain the business cycle with supply-side productivity shocks. We provide some preliminary evidence about how monetary policy affects the aggregate supply side of the macroeconomy through its affect on total factor productivity, an important measure of supply-side performance. The results show that monetary policy exerts a positive and statistically significant effect on the supply-side of the macroeconomy. Moreover, the findings buttress the importance of countercyclical monetary policy as well as support the adoption of an optimal money supply rule. Our results also prove consistent with the effective role of monetary policy in the Great Moderation as well as the more recent rise in productivity growth.

The Geographic Distribution of the Size and Timing of Monetary Policy Actions

This paper examines the magnitude and timing of the effects of changes in the monetary base on the aggregate and regional changes in bank loans within the United States. We consider both Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) regions, and individual states and the District of Columbia for our regional analysis. The empirical analysis provides some insight on the bank-lending channel of monetary policy. We find strong evidence of a 4-quarter lag in the effect of changes in the monetary base on bank loans. That finding proves robust across all regions and nearly all states.

Monetary Policy Under a Currency Board

The consensus view is that central banks under currency boards do not have tools for active monetary policy. In this paper, we analyze the foreign exchange fee as a monetary policy instrument that can be used by a central bank under a currency board. We develop a general equilibrium model showing that changes in this fee may have the same effects as a change in the monetary policy stance. Thus central banks under the currency board are shown to have an avenue to implement active monetary policy.

Deregulation and Structural Change in the U.S. Commercial Banking Industry

Regulatory change not seen since the Great Depression swept the U.S. banking industry beginning in the early 1980s and culminated with the Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994. Banking analysts anticipated dramatic consolidation with large numbers of mergers and acquisitions. Some expressed concern about the long-term health of the smaller community banks. This paper describes and discusses the actual evolution of the U.S. banking industry over the past two decades, using the 1976 to 1998 Report of Condition and Income (Call Report) and merger data recently posted on the web site of the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago. Among several results, more permissive interstate banking and branching regulation significantly associates with higher merger rates, with lower net entry rates, and with higher concentration within states. Interestingly, more permissive intrastate banking and branching regulation only associates with higher concentration.

The Great Moderation and the Relationship between Output Growth and Its Volatility

This study examines the effect of the Great Moderation on the relationship between U.S. output growth and its volatility over the period 1947 to 2006. First, we consider the possible effects of structural change in the volatility process. In so doing, we employ GARCH-M and ARCH-M specifications of the process describing output growth rate and its volatility with and without a one-time structural break in volatility. Second, our data analyses and empirical results suggest no significant relationship between the output growth rate and its volatility, favoring the traditional wisdom of dichotomy in macroeconomics. Moreover, the evidence shows that the time-varying variance falls sharply or even disappears once we incorporate a one-time structural break in the unconditional variance of output starting 1982 or 1984. That is, the integrated GARCH effect proves spurious. Finally, a joint test of a trend change and a one-time shift in the volatility process finds that the one-time shift dominates.

Optimal Central Banker Contracts and Common Agency

This paper considers the contacting approach to central banking in the context of a simple common agency model. The recent literature on optimal contracts suggests that the political principal of the central bank can design the appropriate incentive schemes that remedy for time-inconsistency problems in monetary policy. The effectiveness of such contracts, however, requires a central banker that attaches a positive weight to the incentive scheme. As a result, delegating monetary policy under such circumstances gives rise to the possibility that the central banker may respond to incentive schemes offered by other potential principals. We introduce common agency considerations in the design of optimal central banker contracts. We introduce two principals - society (government) and an interest group, whose objectives conflict with society's and we examine under what circumstances the government-offered or the interest-group-offered contract dominates. Our results largely depend on the type of bias that the interest group contract incorporates. In particular, when the interest group contract incorporates an inflationary bias the outcome depends on the principals' relative concern of the incentive schemes' costs. When the interest group contract incorporates an expansionary bias, however, it always dominates the government contract. A corollary of our results is that central banker contracts aiming to remove the expansionary bias of policymakers should be written explicitly in terms of the perceived bias.

Monetary and Exchange Rate Policy in Multisectorial Economies

We develop a two-sector economy where each sector is classified as classical/Keynesian (contract/noncontract) in the labor market and traded/nontraded in the product market. We consider the effects of changes in monetary and exchange rate policy on sectoral and aggregate prices and outputs for different sectoral characterizations. Duca (1987) shows that nominal wage rigidity facilitates the effectiveness of monetary policy even in the classical sector. We demonstrate that trade price rigidity provides a similar path for the effectiveness of monetary policy, in this case, even when both sectors are classical.