Aggregated Multicast — A Comparative Study

Though IP multicast is resource ef£cient in delivering data to a group of members simultaneously, it suffers from scalability problem with the number of concurrently active multicast groups because it requires a router to keep forwarding state for every multicast tree passing through it. To solve this state scalability problem, we proposed a scheme, called aggregated multicast. The key idea is that multiple groups are forced to share a single delivery tree. In our earlier work, we introduced the basic concept of aggregated multicast and presented some initial results to show that multicast state can be reduced. In this paper, we develop a more quantitative assessment of the cost/bene£t trade-offs. We propose an algorithm to assign multicast groups to delivery trees with controllable cost and introduce metrics to measure multicast state and tree management overhead for multicast schemes. We then compare aggregated multicast with conventional multicast schemes, such as source speci£c tree scheme and shared tree scheme. Our extensive simulations show that aggregated multicast can achieve signi£cant routing state and tree management overhead reduction while containing the expense of extra resources (bandwidth waste and tunnelling overhead). We conclude that aggregated multicast is a very cost-effective and promising direction for scalable transit domain multicast provisioning.

A Note on US Royalty Relief, Rent Sharing and Offshore Oil Production

This paper offers an economic analysis explaining why royalty relief under US Federal legislation is expensive in terms of revenue foregone, but is largely ineffective in increasing US offshore oil production. Repeal of royalty relief is therefore justified.

OPAC Design Enhancements and Their Effects on Circulation and Resource Sharing within the Library Consortium Environment

A longitudinal study of three discrete online public access catalog (OPAC) design enhancements examined the possible effects such changes may have on circulation and resource sharing within the automated library consortium environment. Statistical comparisons were made of both circulation and interlibrary loan (ILL) figures from the year before enhancement to the year after implementation. Data from sixteen libraries covering a seven-year period were studied in order to determine the degree to which patrons may or may not utilize increasingly broader OPAC ILL options over time. Results indicated that while ILL totals increased significantly after each OPAC enhancement, such gains did not result in significant corresponding changes in total circulation.

The Secret Life of Mundane Transaction Costs

Transaction costs, one often hears, are the economic equivalent of friction in physical systems. Like physicists, economists can sometimes neglect friction in formulating theories; but like engineers, they can never neglect friction in studying how the system actually does let alone should work. Interestingly, however, the present-day economics of organization also ignores friction. That is, almost single-mindedly, the literature analyzes transactions from the point of view of misaligned incentives and (especially) transaction-specific assets. The costs involved are certainly costs of running the economic system in some sense, but they are not obviously frictions. Stories about frictions in trade are not nearly as intriguing as stories about guileful trading partners and expensive assets placed at risk. But I will argue that these seemingly dull categories of cost what Baldwin and Clark (2003) call mundane transaction costs actually have a secret life. They are at least as important as, and quite probably far more important than, the more glamorous costs of asset specificity in explaining the partition between firm and market. These costs also have a secret life in another sense: they have a secret life cycle. I will argue that these mundane transaction costs provide much better material for helping us understanding how the boundaries among firms, markets, and hybrid forms change over time.

Tax Collection in History

Methods of tax collection employed by modern governments seem dull when compared to the rich variety observed in history. Whereas most governments today typically use salaried agents to collect taxes, various other types of contractual relationships have been observed in history, including sharing arrangements which divide the tax revenue between the government and collectors at fixed proportions, negotiated payment schemes based on the tax base, and sale of the revenue to a collector in exchange for a lump-sum payment determined at auction. We propose an economic theory of tax collection that can coherently explain the temporal and spatial variation in contractual forms. We begin by offering a simple classification of tax collection schemes observed in history. We then develop a general economic model of tax collection that specifies the cost and benefits of alternative schemes and identifies the conditions under which a government would choose one contractual form over another in maximizing the net revenue. Finally, we use the conclusions of the model to explain some of the well-known patterns of tax collection observed in history and how choices varied over time and space.