Has Deregulation Affected Births, Deaths, and Marriages in the U.S. Commercial Banking Industry?

Regulatory change not seen since the Great Depression swept the U.S. banking industry beginning in the early 1980s and culminating with the Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994. Banking analysts anticipated dramatic consolidation with large numbers of mergers and acquisitions. Less well documented, but equally important, was the continuing entry of new banks, tempering the decline in the overall number of banking institutions. This paper examines whether deregulation affected bank new-charter (birth), failure (death), and merger (marriage) rates during the 1980s and 1990s after controlling for bank performance and state economic activity. We find evidence that intrastate deregulation stimulated births and marriages, but not deaths. Moreover, we find little evidence that interstate deregulation affected births, deaths, or marriages, except that the marriage rate rose after the implementation of the Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act. Finally, pair-wise temporal causality tests among births, deaths, and marriages show that mergers temporally lead new charters and that failures lead mergers (a demonstration effect).

Has Deregulation Affected Births, Deaths, and Marriages in the U.S. Commercial Banking Industry?

Regulatory change not seen since the Great Depression swept the U.S. banking industry beginning in the early 1980s and culminating with the Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994. Banking analysts anticipated dramatic consolidation with large numbers of mergers and acquisitions. Less well documented, but equally important, was the continuing entry of new banks, tempering the decline in the overall number of banking institutions. This paper examines whether deregulation affected bank new-charter, failure, and merger rates during the 1980s and 1990s after controlling for bank performance and state economic activity. We find evidence that intrastate deregulation stimulated new charters and mergers, but not failures. Moreover, we find little evidence that interstate deregulation affected new charters, failures, or mergers.

Deregulation and Structural Change in the U.S. Commercial Banking Industry

Regulatory change not seen since the Great Depression swept the U.S. banking industry beginning in the early 1980s and culminated with the Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994. Banking analysts anticipated dramatic consolidation with large numbers of mergers and acquisitions. Some expressed concern about the long-term health of the smaller community banks. This paper describes and discusses the actual evolution of the U.S. banking industry over the past two decades, using the 1976 to 1998 Report of Condition and Income (Call Report) and merger data recently posted on the web site of the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago. Among several results, more permissive interstate banking and branching regulation significantly associates with higher merger rates, with lower net entry rates, and with higher concentration within states. Interestingly, more permissive intrastate banking and branching regulation only associates with higher concentration.

Geographic Deregulation and Commercial Bank Performance in US State Banking Markets

This paper examines the effects of geographical deregulation on commercial bank performance across states. We reach some general conclusions. First, the process of deregulation on an intrastate and interstate basis generally improves bank profitability and performance. Second, the macroeconomic variables -- the unemployment rate and real personal income per capita -- and the average interest rate affect bank performance as much, or more, than the process of deregulation. Finally, while deregulation toward full interstate banking and branching may produce more efficient banks and a healthier banking system, we find mixed results on this issue.

Interbank Markets under Currency Boards

This paper analyzes interbank markets under currency boards. Under such an environment, problematic endogeneity issues common to other monetary regimes do not arise. Using daily data from the interbank markets in Bulgaria and Lithuania we show, that contrary to the existing literature, overnight interest rates tend to decrease towards the end of the reserve holding period. Empirical results are supported by a finite horizon heterogeneous agents model showing that interest rates tend to decrease in the case of excess aggregate reserves in the banking system. Results contrast with Quir'os and Mendiz'abal (2006) who find that interest rates should be increasing regardless of the outstanding aggregate liquidity in the market. We also show that responsiveness of banks to interest rate changes diminishes as the end of reserve holding period approaches. Under certain circumstances this could lead to multiple equilibria with increasing or decreasing interest rates.

Liberalization, Ownership, and Efficiency in Indian Banking: A Nonparametric Approach

This paper empirically estimates and analyzes various efficiency scores of Indian banks during 1997-2003 using data envelopment analysis (DEA). During the 1990s India's financial sector underwent a process of gradual liberalization aimed at strengthening and improving the operational efficiency of the financial system. It is observed, none the less, that Indian banks are still not much differentiated in terms of input or output oriented technical efficiency and cost efficiency. However, they differ sharply in respect of revenue and profit efficiencies. The results provide interesting insight into the empirical correlates of efficiency scores of Indian banks. Bank size, ownership, and the fact of its being listed on the stock exchange are some of the factors that are found to have positive impact on the average profit efficiency and to some extent revenue efficiency scores are. Finally, we observe that the median efficiency scores of Indian banks in general and of bigger banks in particular have improved considerably during the post-reform period.