Preservice, Secondary Social Studies Teachers' Perceptions of Gender Equity

This study examines preservice, social studies teachers’ perceptions of gender equity. The assumption that preservice teachers recognize gender as an important issue and are willing and able to take the initiative to remedy inequities in their classroom structures and content is considered. Six participants were interviewed using Seidman’s (2006) three-round, interview protocol. A focused life history was compiled to situate participants’ perceptions within their personal and professional experiences. Findings suggest a disconnect between preservice teachers' intentions and their practice in regards to gender equity. More explicit attention to gender equity in teacher education programs is recommended.

Optimal Central Banker Contracts and Common Agency

This paper considers the contacting approach to central banking in the context of a simple common agency model. The recent literature on optimal contracts suggests that the political principal of the central bank can design the appropriate incentive schemes that remedy for time-inconsistency problems in monetary policy. The effectiveness of such contracts, however, requires a central banker that attaches a positive weight to the incentive scheme. As a result, delegating monetary policy under such circumstances gives rise to the possibility that the central banker may respond to incentive schemes offered by other potential principals. We introduce common agency considerations in the design of optimal central banker contracts. We introduce two principals - society (government) and an interest group, whose objectives conflict with society's and we examine under what circumstances the government-offered or the interest-group-offered contract dominates. Our results largely depend on the type of bias that the interest group contract incorporates. In particular, when the interest group contract incorporates an inflationary bias the outcome depends on the principals' relative concern of the incentive schemes' costs. When the interest group contract incorporates an expansionary bias, however, it always dominates the government contract. A corollary of our results is that central banker contracts aiming to remove the expansionary bias of policymakers should be written explicitly in terms of the perceived bias.