Bursting Boilers and the Federal Power Redux: The Evolution of Safety on the Western Rivers

Using newly constructed data series on explosions, deaths, and steamboat traffic, we examine econometrically the causes of increased safety in steamboat boilers in the nineteenth century. Although the law of 1852 (but not that of 1838) did have a dramatic initial effect in reducing explosions, that reduction came against the background not of a system out of control but of a system that from the beginning was steadily increasing boiler safety per person- mile. The role of the federal government in conducting and disseminating basic research on boiler technology may have been more significant for increased safety than its explicit regulatory efforts.

Bank Performance: Market Power or Efficient Structure?

Regulatory change not seen since the Great Depression swept the U.S. banking industry beginning in the early 1980s, culminating with the Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994. Significant consolidations have occurred in the banking industry. This paper considers the market-power versus the efficient-structure theories of the positive correlation between banking concentration and performance on a state-by-state basis. Temporal causality tests imply that bank concentration leads bank profitability, supporting the market-power, rather than the efficient-structure, theory of that positive correlation. Our finding suggests that bank regulators, by focusing on local banking markets, missed the initial stages of an important structural change at the state level.