Behavioral Implications of Knockout for the Dyslexia-Risk Gene Dcdc2 in Mice

Several genetic linkage and epidemiological studies have provided strong evidence that DCDC2 is a candidate gene for developmental dyslexia, a disorder that impairs a person’s reading ability despite adequate intelligence, education, and socio-economic status. Studies investigating embryonic intra-ventricular RNA interference (RNAi) of Dcdc2, a rat homolog of the DCDC2 gene in humans, indicate disruptions in neuronal migration in the rat cortex during development. Interestingly, these anatomical anomalies are consistent with post mortem histological analysis of human dyslexic patients. Other rodent models of cortical developmental disruption have shown impairment in rapid auditory processing and learning maze tasks in affected subjects. The current study investigates the rapid auditory processing abilities of mice heterozygous for Dcdc2 (one functioning Dcdc2 allele) and mice with a homozygous knockout of Dcdc2 (no functioning Dcdc2 allele). It is important to note that this genetic model for behavioral assessment is still in the pilot stage. However, preliminary results suggest that mice with a genetic mutation of Dcdc2 have impaired rapid auditory processing, as well as non-spatial maze learning and memory ability, as compared to wildtypes. By genetically knocking out Dcdc2 in mice, behavioral features associated with Dcdc2 can be characterized, along with other neurological abnormalities that may arise due to the loss of the functioning gene.

Scaling the Costs of 404 Testing to Fit the Needs of Small Public Companies

In July of 2002, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was passed by Congress, including section 404 which requires the auditors to test and opine on the company's internal controls. Since that time there has been much debate about whether the intended benefits of increased investor confidence and financial statement transparency trump the unexpectedly high compliance costs, especially for public companies with market-caps less than $75 million. Before these companies begin complying in the upcoming year, interest groups are calling for the requirements to be 'scaled' to better fit the needs of these companies. While auditors already are expected to scale their audit approach to each individual client, more must be done to significantly decrease the costs in order to reverse the trend of small companies foregoing listing on U.S. capital markets. Increased guidance from the PCAOB, SEC, and other related parties could help the small-cap companies and their auditors be aware of best practices. Also, exempting industries that already follow similar guidelines or are significantly injured by the compliance requirements could help. Lastly, the controversial proposal of rotational audits could be put in place if the affected parties cooperate to remove the undue burden on these small-cap companies. Without some form of significant action, the investors could soon lose the ability to buy small-cap companies in U.S. markets.

What Is Known about Testing for Discrimination: Lessons Learned by Comparing across Different Markets

The paper provides a fairly comprehensive examination of recent empirical work on discrimination within economics. The three major analytical approaches considered are traditional regression analysis of outcomes, paired testing or audits, and finally analysis of performance where higher group performance suggests that a group has been treated disfavorably. The review covers research in the labor, credit, and consumption markets, as well as recent studies of discrimination within the legal system. The review suggests that the validity of interpreting observed racial differences as discrimination depends heavily on whether the analysis is based on a sample that is representative of a population of individuals or households or based on a sample of market transactions, as well as the analyst?s ability to control for heterogeneity within that sample. Heterogeneous firm behavior and differentiated products, such as those found in labor and housing markets, also can confound empirical analyses of discrimination by confusing the allocation of individuals across firms or products with disparate treatment or by ignoring disparate impacts that might arise based on that allocation.