3 resultados para Portfolio Performance Evaluation
em University of Connecticut - USA
Resumo:
Previous multicast research often makes commonly accepted but unverifed assumptions on network topologies and group member distribution in simulation studies. In this paper, we propose a framework to systematically evaluate multicast performance for different protocols. We identify a series of metrics, and carry out extensive simulation studies on these metrics with different topological models and group member distributions for three case studies. Our simulation results indicate that realistic topology and group membership models are crucial to accurate multicast performance evaluation. These results can provide guidance for multicast researchers to perform realistic simulations, and facilitate the design and development of multicast protocols.
Resumo:
Dua and Miller (1996) created leading and coincident employment indexes for the state of Connecticut, following Moore's (1981) work at the national level. The performance of the Dua-Miller indexes following the recession of the early 1990s fell short of expectations. This paper performs two tasks. First, it describes the process of revising the Connecticut Coincident and Leading Employment Indexes. Second, it analyzes the statistical properties and performance of the new indexes by comparing the lead profiles of the new and old indexes as well as their out-of-sample forecasting performance, using the Bayesian Vector Autoregressive (BVAR) method. The new indexes show improved performance in dating employment cycle chronologies. The lead profile test demonstrates that superiority in a rigorous, non-parametric statistic fashion. The mixed evidence on the BVAR forecasting experiments illustrates the truth in the Granger and Newbold (1986) caution that leading indexes properly predict cycle turning points and do not necessarily provide accurate forecasts except at turning points, a view that our results support.
Resumo:
We review and extend the core literature on international transfer price manipulation to avoid or evade taxes. Under negotiated transfer pricing with a viable bargaining structure, including performance evaluation disconnected from the transfer price, divisions voluntarily exchange accurate information to obtain firm-wide optimality, a result not dependent on restraint from exercising internal market power. For intangible licenses, a larger optimal profit shift for a given tax rate change strengthens incentives for transfer pricing abuse. In practice, an intangible's arm's length range is viewed as a guideline, a context where incentives for abuse materialize. Transfer pricing for intangibles obliges greater tax authority scrutiny.