Mental Causation versus Physical Causation: No Contest

Common sense supposes thoughts can cause bodily movements and thereby cause changes in where the agent is or how his surroundings are. Many philosophers suppose that any such outcome is realized in a complex state of affairs involving only microparticles; that previous microphysical developments were sufficient to cause that state of affairs; hence that, barring overdetermination, causation by the mental is excluded. This paper argues that the microphysical swarm that realizes the outcome is an accident (Aristotle) or a coincidence (David Owens) and has no cause, though each component movement in it has one. Mental causation faces no competition "from below".

Global Supervenience on Microphysics

Many philosophers would agree with the claim that the truths reported by the special sciences supervene on the ways the world is at the level of the fundamental particles of physics. At the least this supervenience claim denies independent variability for the truths of the special sciences—but many would add that the ways the world is, microphysically, generate all the special science truths. Call this “Global Supervenience on Microphysics”. What it is for a special science claim to be true, says GSM, just is for the world to be a certain way microphysically. But which way? The popular suggestion is that the microphysical truth-condition for a given special-science statement is whatever microphysical arrangement it is, that renders true the causal import of the special-science statement. I argue that there is no fact of the matter as to which microphysical arrangement this is, and conclude that GSM may be untenable.

The Problem with Utility: Towards a Non-Consequentialist / Utility Theory Synthesis

I develop the argument that our current decision-making framework, utility theory, when used by itself, is 1) descriptively incomplete, 2) theoretically flawed, and 2) ethically questionable. In response, I offer an exploratory framework that incorporates both consequentialist and non-consequentialist motivations. Adding a commitment function provides a synthesis which remedies the problems associated with the sole use of utility theory. Finally, I show how philosophers Immanuel Kant, W.D. Ross, and Martin Buber provide an ethical basis for the framework.